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INTRODUCTION

The explosive growth of technology in the last two decades has vastly
expanded intellectual property jurisprudence and elevated intellectual
property to a heightened status in the marketplace.1
Indeed, a
company's intellectual property assets may now be its most valuable
corporate assets. Moreover, the property value of some trademarks is
significantly greater than that of the trademark owner's physical assets.3
The term "intellectual property" is commonly understood to include
patents, trade secrets, copyrights, and trademarks.4 Yet a paradigm has

1

See David H. Kennedy, Structuring Deals Involving Significant Intellectual Property
Assets, 740 PLI/Pat 947, 991 (2003) (recognizing important role of intellectual property in
modem economy and observing that "[m]ulti-billion dollar companies more and more
frequently have their origins in a set of ideas, and the entire life cycles of world-leading
enterprises are governed by the legal relationships created between inventors, investors,
producers and consumers of intellectual property."). Intellectual property also greatly
influences changes across major sectors of society. Richard S. Gruner, IntangibleInventions:
Patentable Subject Matter for an Information Age, 35 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 355, 360-61 (2002)
(noting that "information-processing innovation is at the heart of many of the most
important changes now underway in our individual, social, business, and governmental
activities.").
2 See Bruce A. Lehman, Intellectual Property: America's Competitive Advantage in the 21st
Century, 31 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 6, 10 (1996) ("Both new corporations and restructured
corporations and industries are finding that one of their most valuable assets is their
intellectual property."); see also William J. Murphy, Proposalfor a Centralized and Integrated
Registry for Security Interests in Intellectual Property, 41 IDEA 297, 297 (2002) (observing that
in knowledge-based economy intellectual property assets, not buildings and machinery,
are most relevant and valuable assets); Jerry T. Myers, Where Have All the Assets Gone?
Finding the Intangible Value of the Bankrupt E-commerce Company, 697 PLI/Pat 41, 53 (2002)
(stating that for e-commerce companies intellectual property rights are among most
valuable assets).
3 Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational
Basis for
Trademark Protection, 58 U. Prr-r. L. REv. 789, 790-91 (1997) (stating that trademarks as
brands have become more valuable than physical assets and other forms of intellectual
property). "Put simply, 'a trademark is that which makes tomorrow's business something
more than an accident."' Id. (quoting UNITED STATES TRADEMARK Assoc., TRADEMARKS IN
ADVERTISING AND SELLING 1 (1966)); see also Thomas D. Drescher, The Transformation and
Evolution of Trademarks -From Signals to Symbols to Myth, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 301, 301-02
(1992) ("The production plants and inventories of The Coca-Cola Company could go up in
flames overnight.... Yet, on the following morning, there is not a bank... that would not
lend this Company the funds necessary for rebuilding, accepting as security only the
inherent goodwill in its trademarks 'Coca-Cola' and 'Coke."' (quoting Julius R. Lunsford,
Jr., Good Will in Trade Marks: Coca-Cola and Coke, THE COCA-COLA BOTILER 27, Mar. 1955, at
27)).
. See, e.g., Terri Branstetter Cohen, Anti-Circumvention: Has Technology's Child Turned
Against Its Mother?, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 961, 964 (2003) (stating that intellectual
property laws traditionally encompass four separate and distinct types of intangible
property: patents, trademarks, copyrights, and trade secrets); Jean Raymond Homere,
Intellectual Property Rights Can Help Stimulate the Economic Development of Least Developed
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been constructed and enforced over the last fifteen years wherein only
patents, trade secrets, and copyrights are included.s The paradigm
specifically excludes trademarks from some of the protections afforded
to the other three types of intellectual property.6 Under the paradigm,
the licensees of patents, trade secrets, and copyrights are allowed to
retain the right to use the licenses after the licensor has petitioned for
bankruptcy and decided to sever the license agreements. On the other
hand, a bankrupt licensor's severing of a trademark license agreement
extinguishes the licensee's license rights. 8 This Intellectual Property
Bankruptcy Paradigm ("the Paradigm") is embodied in the Intellectual
Property Licenses in Bankruptcy Act. 9
The Paradigm calls into question the normative values given to
patents, trade secrets, and copyrights, on one end of the spectrum, and
trademarks, on the other end. The fast changing role of trademarks in
Internet global communication and commerce calls into question the
exclusion of trademarks from the Paradigm." Further, the modern and
less restrictive quality control practices and the integration of trademarks
into the bundle of licensed rights in the marketplace undermine the

Countries, 27 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTs 277, 279 (2004) (stating that intellectual property
rights include patents, trade secrets, trademarks, and copyrights); Thomas J. Krumenacher,
Note, Protection for Indigenous Peoples and Their Traditional Knowledge: Would a Registry
System Reduce the Misappropriationof Traditional Knowledge?, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
143, 143 (2004) (noting that conventional branches of intellectual property include patents,
copyrights, trade secrets, and trademarks).
' See infra Part II.
6 See infra Part II.
' See generally Schlumberger Res. Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Cellnet Data Sys., Inc., 327 F.3d
242, 250 (3d Cir. 2003); Encino Bus. Mgmt., Inc. v. Prize Frize, Inc., 32 F.3d 426, 429 (9th Cir.
1994).
See generally In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. 507 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003); In re
8
Centura Software Corp., 281 B.R. 660 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002).
' Act of Oct. 18, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-506, 102 Stat. 2538 (codified as 11 U.S.C.
§ 365(n) (2000)).
," A recent article authored by Professors Gideon Parchomovsky and Peter Siegelman
offers a fresh examination of the synergy between patents and trademarks, challenging the
traditional view of discrete and fragmented protection. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter
Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of Intellectual Property,88 VA. L. REV. 1455 (2002).
" The Internet has profoundly influenced the recent development of trademark
jurisprudence and usage. See generally Dan L. Burk, Trademark Doctrinesfor Global Electronic
Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REV. 695 (1998); John M. Carson et al., Claim Jumping on the Newest
Frontier: Trademarks, Cybersquatting,and the Judicial Interpretationof Bad Faith, 8 UCLA ENT.
L. REV. 27 (2000); Marcelo Halpern & Ajay K. Mehrota, From InternationalTreaties to Internet
Norms: The Evolution of InternationalTrademark Disputes in the Internet Age, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 523 (2000).
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foundation of the Paradigm.
This Article contends that the Paradigm's exclusion of trademarks is
the result of a legislative reaction that occurred without a proper inquiry
into trademark's status as intellectual property, and that the exclusion
threatens to bankrupt the goodwill of trademarks. This Article argues
that trademark's rapidly evolving role in the Internet economy and in
integrated intellectual property licensing calls for an end to the exclusion
of trademarks from the Paradigm.
Part I examines the phenomenal rise of trademarks through licensing
and the global Internet medium.
This Part analyzes how the
liberalization of the quality control requirement in licensing
arrangements has fostered the expanded role of trademarks in the
marketplace.
Part II identifies the Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Paradigm in
which patents, copyrights, and trade secrets - but not trademarks - are
protected. This Part discusses the enactment of the Intellectual Property
Licenses in Bankruptcy Act ("IPLBA"), and argues that Congress passed
the Act in reaction to a court decision. Congress claimed that the
creation of the IPLBA was necessary to maintain U.S. leadership in
technology development. This rationale, however, does not justify the
exclusion of trademarks from the Paradigm that protects only patent,
copyright, and trade secret licenses. This Part explores the rationale and
its limitations by examining, comparing, and contrasting patents,
copyrights, trade secrets, and trademarks.
Part III analyzes how notable cases have perpetuated the Paradigm.
This Part identifies the consequences of the Paradigm on trademark
licenses by examining two cases in which courts have applied the law
and extinguished licensees' rights to use licensed trademarks. Canons of
statutory construction force courts to perpetuate the Paradigm, and do
not permit courts to consider the high cost borne only by licensees of
trademarks.
Part IV questions whether the Paradigm's exclusion of trademarks is
rational in light of both the increased importance of Internet domain
names as trademarks and the integration of trademark licenses as parts
of the bundle of licensed rights. This Part focuses on the threat of
bankrupting the goodwill of trademarks and its potential threat to the
nascent e-commerce economy. This Part examines the consequences that
ensue when the licenses of trademarked domain names and the licenses
of trademarks in integrated licensing schemes are terminated and
12

See infra PartW.
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subsequently used by the bankrupt licensor or its authorized third party
in association with different web pages, mix-matched, or materially
different goods.
Part V recommends the end of the exclusion of trademarks from the
In light of the changing role of trademarks and the
Paradigm.
integration of trademarks in intellectual property licensing schemes, an
amendment to the existing law is appropriate. When Congress enacted
the IPLBA, quality control was the rationale for the exclusion of
trademarks from the protection provided under the IPLBA. Such
concern, however, does not justify the exclusion of trademarks. This Part
also proposes and evaluates ways in which the exclusion of trademarks
should cease.
The Article concludes that the changing role of trademarks, the
integration of trademarks into intellectual property licensing, and the
apparent lack of benefits to the bankruptcy estate, unsecured creditors,
and consumers, necessitate a shift in the Intellectual Property
Bankruptcy Paradigm.
I.

TRADEMARKS, LICENSES, AND PROPERTY

A.

The Rise of Trademarks

Trademarks are words, phrases, logos, symbols, and devices" that are
used in commerce to signify a source and to distinguish the source from
others.14 The roots of trademark use can be traced back to antiquity"
when artisans used marks to identify their pottery. 6 Traders then

15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) (defining trademarks).
See Eric J. Lubochinski, Hegel's Secret: Personalityand the Housemark Cases, 52 EMORY
L.J. 489, 489 (2003) (stating courts have long held that trademarks are source identifiers);
Tyler T. Ochoa, Patent and Copyright Term Extension and the Constitution: A Historical
Perspective,49 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 19, 93 (2001) (stating that trademarks must serve
as source identifiers, distinguishing "the goods or services of the mark owner from those of
others"). Judge Kozinski, however, has suggested that trademarks serve not only as source
identifiers, but also as part of the goods or services themselves. Alex Kozinski, Trademarks
Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 972-73 (1993).
1 See Daniel M. McClure, Trademarks and Unfair Competition: A Critical History of Legal
Thought, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 305, 310 (1979) ("The earliest use of marks on goods dates to
antiquity...."); Gerald Ruston, On the Origin of Trademarks, 45 TRADEMARK REP. 127, 128
(1955) ("The history of marks is very old indeed. I have seen reproductions of some
examples of stone-age pottery bearing marking of perhaps 5,000 B.C.").
13
1

16 BEVERLY W. PATrISHALL ET AL., TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 1 (1994);

see

also Amir H. Khoury, Ancient and Islamic Sources of Intellectual Property Protection in the
Middle East: A Focus on Trademarks, 43 IDEA 151, 156 n.24 (2003) (noting examples of marks
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marked their wares to distinguish them from goods produced by
17
others.
Cattle raisers branded their animals to identify source and
ownership. 8
Though trademarks have been used for millennia, trademark
jurisprudence is relatively young, with origins in the common law
system and the 1584 Sandforth's Case in England. 9 In the United States,
the earliest recorded trademark case was in Massachusetts in 1837."'
Under the common law of "passing off," the trademark owner sought
protection for its trademarks.2'
In the late nineteenth- and early

affixed on ancient pottery in Transylvania, Greece, Crete, and China).
7 See Graziella M. Sarno, Comment, Viet Nam or Bust: Why Trademark Pirates are
Leaving Chinafor Better Opportunitiesin Viet Nam, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 291, 296 (1996) (stating
that in Tang Dynasty (618-906 A.D.) traders and merchants marked their goods to
distinguish ownership); see also Geoffrey T. Willard, An Examination of China's Emerging
Intellectual Property Regime: Historical Underpinnings,the Current System and Prospectsfor the
Future, 6 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 411, 413 (1996) (stating that "[t]he first known
trademarks surfaced in China nearly 3000 years ago, during the reign of the Zhou
Dynasty.").
" Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical Developments of Trademarks, 65 TRADEMARK REP.
265, 266-67 (1975); see Curtis Nyquist, A Spectrum Theory of Negotiability, 78 MARQ. L. REV.
897, 959 n.390 (1995) (noting that term "ear-mark" referred to "a brand that allowed the
owner to reclaim cattle if lost or stolen"); Ruston, supra note 15, at 129 (discussing ear-mark
brand on cattle in Madagascar during Stone Age). In Texas, the branding of cattle to
signify ownership officially began on July 1, 1762. Robert L. Dabney, Jr., Texas - The Land
of the Brave (1518-1821), 39 Hous. LAW. 12, 17 (Apr. 2002).
19 In Sandforth's Case, the plaintiff alleged an action of deceit by the defendant's use of a
trademark similar to the plaintiff's mark. The case is discussed in greater detail in Keith M.
Stolte, How Early Did Anglo-American Trademark Law Begin? An Answer to Schechter's
Conundrum, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 505 (1998); see also SHELDON W.
HALPERN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF UNITED STATES INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW,
COPYRIGHT, PATENT, AND TRADEMARK 276 (1999).
20 See FRANK H. FOSTER & ROBERT L. SHOOK, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, & TRADEMARKS 22

(2d ed. 1993). The earliest appellate court decision concerning trademarks occurred in 1844
in Taylor v. Carpenter,23 F. Cas. 742 (C.C. Mass. 1844). See also Mark A. Thurmon, Ending
the Seventh Amendment Confusion: A CriticalAnalysis of the Right to a Jury Trial in Trademark
Cases, 11 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 65 (2002).
21 The history of trademark jurisprudence, as observed by a commentator, is
an
offshoot of common law tort:
The development of trademark law in America paralleled that of English law. It
developed as an offshoot of the tort of fraud and deceit, and was called "passing
off."... confusion was recognized as one basis for trademark suits, the dominant
rationale for relief in such cases was 'the promotion of honesty and fair dealings,
because no one has a right to use his own goods as the goods of another.'... The
early development of trademark law in America was thus based firmly on
notions of morality, focusing on the fraudulent activity of the defendant.
McClure, supra note 15, at 314-15.
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22

twentieth-centuries, protection was codified first in the Trademark
Acts73 then later in the more comprehensive Lanham Act.24
to protect
law has . expanded
In recent years •federal. trademark
2
25
Essentially, in
trademarks against diluhon and cybersquatting.
addition to protecting against infringement, the trademark owner can
protect famous trademarks from tarnishment or blurring use by a third
party. 27 The trademark owner also has a new statutory right against the
22 As observed by Frank Schechter, the Industrial Revolution profoundly influenced
the development of trademarks and trademark jurisprudence:

[T]rade-marks did not develop as valuable symbols of good-will so long as
producer and consumer were in close contact.... Close upon the Industrial
Revolution came a tremendous expansion not only in the means of production
and distribution but, proportionately, in the advertising of goods, in which
process trade-marks for the first time acquired a national and not merely local
significance.
FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO TRADEMARKS, 129-30 (1925).

The United States Supreme Court struck down the early Trademark Act as
unconstitutional, holding that the Act was beyond the power of Congress to enact under
the patent and copyright clause. The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 96 (1879). Congress
then enacted the federal trademark protection statute under the Commerce Clause. See
Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Shifting the Paradigmin E-commerce: Move Over Inherently Distinctive
Trademarks -The E-Brand, I-Brand and Generic Domain Names Ascending to Power? 50 AM. U.
L. REV. 937, 942 n.26 (2001) (noting development of trademark statutes).
Trademark registrations experienced a slow start at the beginning, as observed by
Schechter that until "1870 only sixty-two trade-mark cases in all were decided by American
courts. An idea of the growth of the importance of trade-marks to their owners may be
gathered from the fact that in 1870 only one hundred and twenty-one trade-marks were
registered under the Trademark Act... while in 1923 almost fifteen thousand were
registered." SCHECTER, supranote 22, at 134.
24 See Jean Wegman Bums, Confused Jurisprudence: False Advertising Under the Lanham
Act, 79 B.U. L. Rev. 807, 811-16 (1999) (analyzing legislative and social history of Lanham
Act); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Attribution Right in the United States: Caught in the
Crossfire Between Copyright and Section 43(a), 77 WASH. L. REv. 985, 1003 (2002) (stating that
Lanham Act was enacted to codify common law trademark doctrine of "passing off"
representation of defendant's goods as those of plaintiff).
The Lanham Act was enacted in 1946. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269-70 (1987) (analyzing
legislative history of Lanham Act and stating that rationales for trademark protections
were to reduce consumer search costs and to encourage producers to make high quality
products); see also S. Rep. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1274.
' See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 987 (1995)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000)).
26 See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501
(1999) (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000)).
27 See Jason R. Edgecombe, Comment, Off the Mark: Bringing the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act in Line With Established Trademark Law, 51 EMORY L.J. 1247, 1253-56 (2002)
(summarizing trademark dilution under tamishment and blurring theories); Katherine
23
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unauthorized registration of trademarks as Internet domain names.2
29
Through years of expansive use, advertisement, and enforcement,
some trademarks have become known worldwide and are very valuable
corporate assets. 3° For example, it is estimated that the Marlboro mark is
worth $44.6 billion, the Coca-Cola mark over $43 billion, and the
McDonald's mark nearly $19 billion." The owner of a trademark has the
right to reap the financial reward from the goodwill it has established in
association with the trademark, and the law protects the owner from
those who poach that goodwill.32
With these legal rights protecting valuable trademarks, the trademark
owner can maximize its position in the marketplace. One of the most
common methods of trademark expansion in the marketplace is

Ruwe, Comment, The Federal Trademark Dilution Act: "Actual Harm" or "Likelihood of
Dilution"?, 70 U. CN. L. REV 1175, 1178-91 (2002) (analyzing federal circuit courts'
conflicting decisions on standard of proof for dilution).
' See Dara B. Gilwit, Note, The Latest Cybersquatting Trend: Typosquatters, Their
Changing Tactics, and How to Prevent Public Deception and Trademark Infringement, 11 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL'Y 267, 280-32 (2003) (stating that new statute assists trademark owners in
combating cybersquatters); cf. Suzanna Sherry, Haste Makes Waste: Congress and the Common
Law in Cyberspace, 55 VAND. L. REV. 309, 320 (2002) (arguing that anti-cybersquatting
consumer protection act was unnecessary because federal trademark dilution act alone can
curb cybersquatting).
'
Brendan Mahaffey-Dowd, Famous Trademarks: Ordinary Inquiry by the Court of Marks
Entitled to an ExtraordinaryRemedy, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 423, 425 (1998) (noting that "[o]wners
of famous marks typically spend millions of dollars to promote the mark and to create an
instant association between that mark and the product in the minds of consumers.").
Companies like Proctor & Gamble, General Motors, and Phillip Morris spend billions of
dollars annually to advertise and promote their trademarks. Id. at 425 n.15 (stating that
Proctor & Gamble spent $2.6 billion in 1996, General Motors $2.37 billion, and Phillip
Morris $2.28 billion on advertising and promoting their brands).
' After years of building the goodwill in a trademark, the owner can sell, license, or
assign the trademark to a third party for monetary exchange. The value of a trademark
right can be quite significant. See, e.g., United Drug Co. v. Parodney, 24 F.2d 577, 579
(E.D.N.Y. 1928) ("[Tlheoretically and perhaps practically as well, this hard-earned right is
as important as money in the bank.").
31 Mahaffey-Dowd, supra note 29, at 425 nn.15 & 17.
32 "The protection of such monopolies in names seems, then, to rest on the social
interest in protecting primarily, not the consumer, but the businessman who has gained a
strategic advantage, through building up of good-will, against unfair practices by
competitors who desire to poach on this good-will." E. Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren,
Ltd., 137 F.2d 955, 958 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 758 (1943); see Qualitex Co. v.
Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) (stating that trademark law aims to assure
producers that they will be able to "reap the financial, reputation-related rewards" of their
product); United States v. Hon, 904 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1069 (1991)
(stating that trademark law protects "the trademark owner's investment in the quality of
the mark and his product's reputation," purpose that is "independent of the goal of
preventing consumer deception").
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licensing.3
B.

TrademarkLicensing and Quality Control

A trademark license is a grant of a specified right to use the trademark
in connection with particular goods or services, in a field of use,34 and
35
within a geographic area. A license can be exclusive or non-exclusive3
with respect to field of use and geography.
Trademark licensing is a common practice today. Prior to the 1946
enactment of the Lanham Act, trademark licensing was restricted as
courts held that trademark licensing without a transfer of business assets
amounted to abandonment of the trademark.3 The enactment of the

See generally Jack Russo, Why License? Business Strategies for "Win/Win" Agreements,
458 PLI/Pat 201 (1996); Linda J. Soranno, The Business and Legal Fundamentals of Corporate
Licensing, 534 PLI/Pat 127 (1998).
See Lisa Keyes & Amanda Nyes, Fundamentalsof Trademark Licensing, 733 PLI/Pat 7,
15-16 (2003) (stating that "field of use" is essentially on "what products or services the
trademarks may be used"); see also Michael Fawlk, TrademarkDelimitation Agreements Under
Article 85 of The Treaty of Rome, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 223, 226 (1992) (stating that restrictions
on use of trademark in relation to goods and/or services is called "field of use
restrictions").
3' George J. Alexander, Competing in Global Product Innovation: Is Antitrust Immunity
Necessary?, 6 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 147, 158 (1991) ("[Als a general
matter, trademark owners can license exclusive territories for their use."); Fawlk, supra note
34, at 226 (stating that restrictions on use of trademark in certain geographic areas are
"territorial restrictions").
' An exclusive licensee may have a standing to sue under trademark law. Ultrapure
Sys., Inc. v. Ham-Let Group, 921 F. Supp. 659 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Susan Progroff, Trademark
Licensing, 722 PLI/Pat 13, 28-29 (2002), citing Quabaug Rubber Co. v. Fabiano Shoe Co., 567
F.2d 154 (1st Cir. 1977). Both exclusive and non-exclusive licensees have "standing to
assert a claim of unfair competition under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1125(a), which provides that an action may be brought by 'any person who believes that he
or she is or is likely to be damaged' by the acts of unfair competition." Progroff, supra, at
29.
Trademark law permits exclusive licensees to register the licensed trademarks. 15
U.S.C. § 1056 (2000). The registration of the trademarks must be in the name of the
trademark owner and all uses of the registered trademark by the licensee inures exclusively
to the benefits of the trademark owner. Id. §§ 1052, 1056, 1127.
37 See Russo, supra note 33, at 204-05 (discussing business trends favoring licensing);
Soranno, supra note 33, at 131 (stating that as trademarks become valuable corporate assets,
companies embark on licensing programs to reap benefits of trademark assets).
' See Alfred M. Marks, Trademark Licensing - Towards a More Flexible Standard, 78
TRADEMARK REP. 641, 642 (1988) (stating that trademark licensing was prohibited, "except
as incidental to a transfer of the business or property in connection with which it has been
used" (quoting MacMahan Pharmacal Co. v. Denver Chem. Mfg. Co., 113 F. 468, 474-75
(8th Cir. 1901))); see, e.g., Reddy Kilowatt, Inc. v. Mid-Carolina Elec. Coop., 240 F 2d 282,
289 (4th Cir. 1957).

1276

University of California,Davis

[Vol. 37:1267

Lanham Act legalized trademark licensing, 39 paving the way for
extensive trademark licensing. 40 Trademark licensing facilitates national
and global commerce and the exploitation of trademarks through more
complex licensing programs such as franchising41 and character
hcensing.
A trademark owner may decide to license its trademarks for a number
of reasons." The trademark owner can gain revenue from royalty fees
without the need to engage in the manufacture or marketing of the
products. 44 The trademark owner can broaden its reach to different

Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000,
88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2211 (2000) (stating that Lanham Act clarified that trademark
licensing was "perfectly lawful activity").
' Professor Merges, in his review of the development of intellectual property law,
keenly observes:
[The] liberalization of trademark licensing had very important consequences for
twentieth-century commerce. In particular, secure trademark licensing helped
usher in two important commercial practices with significant economic
repercussions:
(1) national franchising, and (2) so-called character and
merchandise licensing.
Id. at 2212.
, See Deborah S. Coldwell, et al., Franchise Law, 55 SMU L. REV. 1075, 1106 (2002)
(stating that franchising involves intellectual property rights such as trademarks, trade
names, proprietary system of operation, and trade dress).
' Character merchandising is a type of licensing wherein the characters are used in
connection with products and services. See Jay S. Kogan, Character Licensing, 692 PLI/Pat
223, 229 (2002). The history of character merchandising begins in the early twentieth
century:
Beginning in the early twentieth century with characters from comic strips such
as Buster Brown and Mutt and Jeff, followed by the characters from comic books
such as Superman and Batman, animation characters like Mickey Mouse, and
radio characters like the Lone Ranger, and gradually but continually expanding
thereafter with major growth from the 1970s forward with the blockbuster
movies accompanied by merchandising tie-ins exemplified by the Star Wars
phenomenon, characters have developed into one of the most valuable sources
for licensing and merchandising. Characters are now licensed for use in
connection with nearly every conceivable media, product, and service.
Id.; see also Jessica Litman, Mickey Mouse Emeritus: Character Protection and the Public
Domain, 11 U. MIAM ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 429, 432-33 (1994) (critiquing expansive
protection under Lanham Act for characters).
" See Russo, supra note 33, at 207-11 (analyzing range of benefits flowing from
licensing programs); Soranno, supra note 33, at 131-34 (discussing numerous benefits
gained by trademark licensor through licensing practices).
See Russo, supra note 33, at 207 (stating financial benefit as primary reason for
licensing); Soranno, supra note 33, at 131-32 (stating that through licensing, trademark
owner "gains entry into markets that may not be readily accessible to it,... assigns risk of
product development to an outside organization,... shares the cost of advertising and
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fields of use and different markets through licensing programs.45
Trademark licensing allows the trademark owner to build and enhance
the goodwill of the trademark through the licensee's use of the
trademark, without the trademark owner's actual use of the trademark
in the marketplace.4
A trademark owner may choose to use the trademark on some of its
products and to license the right to use the mark for other goods and
services to a third party, particularly where the trademark owner has
little or no manufacturing or marketing expertise in the area of the
licensed products.47 For example, the owner of the television show The
Simpsons may want to capitalize on the popularity of the show by
granting the right to use the Simpsons trademark to various companies
for use on clothing, toys, cereals, snacks, school supplies, and similar
Typically, a trademark owner uses a licensing agent to
products.4
41
manage the licensing program.

promoting the trademark,... and... enhances earnings through royalty income").
" See Keyes & Nyes, supra note 34, at 19 (stating that licensor can grant licensee right
to establish new brand by use of licensed trademark in new field of use).
,6 See 2 STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND RELATED RIGHTS 1127 (1975)
(stating that licensing to unrelated third party yields greater profitability).
11 J. Allison Strickland, Fundamentals of Trademark and Copyright Licensing, 741 PLI/Pat
275, 277 (2003).
48 See Mathew D. Caudill, Beyond the Cheese: Discerning What "Causes Dilution" Under
15 U.S.C. 1125(c) -- A Recommendation to Whittle Away the Liberal Application of Trademark
Dilution to Internet Domain Names, 13 FORDHAM INTEL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 231, 264
(2002) (noting that Warner Brothers expands trademark Road Runner for use in connection
with high speed Internet service and numerous merchandising items); Cheryl M.
Friedman, Trademark Protection of Motion Pictures, Merchandising Items, and Television
Programs in the Republic of China, 13 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 36, 37 (1990) (stating that
in entertainment industry, trademarked product may be "anything from an item of
merchandise sold in connection with a feature film or television show, to the name of the
film or show itself").
A merchandising right may be quite extensive. For example, the merchandising
right for Toy Story, may be defined as:
the right to make, use, sell, exercise or otherwise exploit and license or authorize
others to make, use, sell, exercise or otherwise exploit tangible personal property,
of any and all kinds, based upon, utilizing or embodying... Toy Story, or any of
the characters or story or other unique elements thereof, including without
limitation any unique names, likenesses or characteristics of any character
portrayed therein other than pre-existing Disney characters, or any unique title,
catch word, slogan, situations, designs, equipment or events depicted therein, or
any trademark, trade name or copyright related thereto other than pre-existing
Disney marks.
Joseph Yang et al., Sample Complex Content Agreement, 736 PLI/Pat 531, 541-42 (2003).
1 Soranno, supranote 33, at 138 (stating that many companies use third party licensing
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Intellectual property owners also license trademarks in connection
with the licensing of copyrighted works, particularly in the case of
character merchandising. ° For example, Tarzan, Superman, Mickey
Mouse, 1 Yogi Bear, and The Flintstones licenses involve both
copyrighted works and trademarks. 2 Likewise, some software licenses
involve both copyrighted computer programs and the trademarks
associated with the software programs.'

agents to manage and administer their licensing programs); see Kristine A. Brown, Native
American Team Names and Mascots: Disparagingand Insensitive Or just a Partof the Game?, 9
SPORTS LAW. J. 115, 123 (2002) (noting that in professional sports industry, many leagues
"have been so successful in marketing their teams' trademarks that they have created
exclusive licensing agents such as NFL Properties, Major League Baseball Properties, NBA
Properties, and the Licensing Company of America").
o See Strickland, supra note 47, at 279 (discussing license of copyrights in conjunction
with trademarks in character merchandising).
51 See Leslie A. Kurtz, The Independent Legal Lives of Fictional Characters, 1986 Wis. L.
REV. 429, 474-77 & n.259 (1986) (analyzing copyright and trademark protections for
characters such as Tarzan, Superman, and Mickey Mouse).
52 See
Strickland, supra note 47, at 279 (providing examples of character
merchandising).
"' See, e.g., In re Centura Software Corp., 281 B.R. 660, 673 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002).
Many software companies include in the end user license agreement a provision asserting
their copyright, patent, trade secrets, and trademark rights in the software. Daniel C.
Miller, Note, Determining Ownership in Virtual Worlds: Copyright and License Agreements, 22
REv. LMG. 435, 438 (2003). Licensees of software usually would like to have in a software
license agreement a warranty of rights such as:
Licensor represents and warrants that it has all rights necessary to license the
Licensed Software to Licensee pursuant to this Agreement and that Licensee's
use [and distribution] of the Licensed Software in accordance with this
Agreement will not infringe any third party's patents, copyrights, trade secret
rights, trademarks, or other intellectual property or proprietary rights of any
nature.
Eric M. Reifschneider & Barbara A. Walkowski, Warranty, Indemnification, and Limitation of
Liability Provisionsin Software License Agreements, 1356 PLI/Corp 741, 757 (2003).
In recent years, patent protection for computer software has become available if a
computer-related method claim produces a "useful, concrete and tangible result." State St.
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998). See
generally AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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A franchise is a type of complex trademark license.5
In certain
industries such as hotel,"5 fast food,s6or clothing, 7 the trademark owner
establishes market penetration through franchising rather than engaging

I See Michael J. Lockerby, Revisionist History? Kicking the Tires of J. Michael Dady's
Market Withdrawal Cases, 21 FRANCHISE L.J. 177, 217 n.112 (2002) (noting that some states
define franchise in terms of trademark licenses). For example, the Arkansas Franchise
Practices Act defines "franchise" as:
a written or oral agreement for a definite or indefinite period, in which a person
grants to another person a license to use a trade name, trademark, service mark,
or related characteristic within an exclusive or nonexclusive territory, or to sell or
distribute goods or services within an exclusive or nonexclusive territory, at
wholesale, retail, by lease agreement, or otherwise.
Id.; see also Philip F. Zeidman, Franchising and Other Methods of Distribution: Regulatory
Patternand JudicialTrends, 1355 PLI/Corp 1071, 1085 (2003). Zeidman states:
"Franchise" means a contract or agreement, either expressed or implied, whether
oral or written, between two or more persons by which: (1) A franchisee is
granted the right to engage in the business of offering, selling or distributing
goods or services under a marketing plan or system prescribed in substantial
part by a franchisor; and (2) The operation of the franchisee's business pursuant
to such plan or system is substantially associated with the franchisor's
trademark, service mark, trade name, logotype, advertising or other commercial
symbol designating the franchisor or its affiliate; and (3) The franchisee is
required to pay, directly or indirectly, a franchise fee.
Id.
A typical franchise agreement includes the license of trademarks to be used in the
franchise. See Joseph Philip Forte, FranchisorComfort Letter, 446 PLI/Real 705, 707 (1999)
(listing trademark license in franchise agreement); Jonathan Solish et al., Franchising
Currents, 14 FRANCHISE L.J. 105, 105 (1995) ("Hospitality Franchise Systems owns the
franchising and trademark licensing rights to Days Inns, Ramada, Howard Johnson, Super
8, and Park Inns, which together make up approximately twenty-five percent of the
domestic hotel franchising market."). When a franchise is terminated, but the franchisee
still continues to use the licensed trademark, the franchisor can initiate a trademark
infringement action against the franchisee. See, e.g., Choice Hotels Int'l. Inc. v. Pennave
Assocs., 159 F. Supp. 2d 780 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (awarding fees where defendant franchisee
continued to make use of mark Clarion Hotel after franchisor sent several cease and desist
letters and issued notice of termination of hotel franchise agreement).
See Bethany L. Appleby, Interim Relief: Preserving Franchising Goodwill During
Termination Proceeding,22 FRANCHISE L.J. 125, 126 (2002) (analyzing subject matter of typical
fast-food restaurant franchise agreement with respect to termination arbitration). An
example is a case where the franchisee of a fast-food restaurant is in bankruptcy. See In re
Sunrise Rest., Inc., 135 B.R. 149 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) (holding that franchise agreement
was transferable, despite anti-assignment clause in agreement, because arrangement was
not one involving special task, skill, or ability on franchisee's part).
"' See Erin Ann O'Hara, Opting Out Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis of Contractual
Choice of Law, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1551, 1591 (2000) (stating that fast food restaurants, clothing
and shoe stores, convenience stores, and car rentals are among more well-known franchise
businesses).
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in self-operation.58 Under a franchise arrangement, the franchisor grants
the franchisee the right to engage in the franchisor's business bearing the
franchisor's trademark in exchange for a franchise fee. 9
Whether a trademark arrangement is a simple license or a complex
franchise agreement, the quality control of the use of the trademark is an
important issue. A trademark license is deemed "uncontrolled" or
"naked" if the licensor fails to maintain adequate control over the quality
of the uses of the trademark. 60 Uncontrolled use may be deemed an
See Frank J. Cavico, "Extraordinary or Specialized Training" as a "Legitimate Business
Interest" in Restrictive Covenant Employment Law: Florida and National Perspectives, 14 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 53, 92-95 (2001) (analyzing number of cases involving retail franchising of
goods and services).
Typical in its approach to these arrangements, the Minnesota Franchise Law defines
a franchise as including:
(1) a contract or agreement, either express or implied, whether oral or written,
for a definite or indefinite period, between two or more persons:
(i) by which a franchisee is granted the right to engage in the business of
offering or distributing goods or services using the franchisor's trade name,
trademark, service mark, logotype, advertising, or other commercial symbol or
related characteristics;
(ii) in which the franchisor and franchisee have a community of interest in the
marketing of goods or services at wholesale, retail, by lease, agreement, or
otherwise; and
(iii) for which the franchisee pays, directly or indirectly, a franchise fee
Minn. Stat. § 80C.01 (2000). See generally Lockerby, supra note 54, at 217 n.112.
60

The Lanham Act allows licensing of trademarks as long as the licensor maintains

quality control:
Where a registered mark or a mark sought to be registered is or may be used
legitimately by related companies, such use shall inure to the benefit of the
registrant or applicant for registration, and such use shall not affect the validity
of such mark or of its registration, provided such mark is not used in such
manner as to deceive the public.
15 U.S.C. § 1055 (2000).
The term "related company" means any person whose use of a mark is controlled by
the owner of the mark regarding the nature and quality of the goods or services on or in
connection with which the mark is used. Id. § 1127.
61 The quality control requirement embraced by courts and commentators has been
challenged as lacking legal and practical foundations. Kevin Parks, "Naked" Is Not a FourLetter Word: Debunking the Myth of the "Quality Control Requirement" in Trademark Licensing,
82 TRADEMARK REP. 531 (1992). The commentator identified the fundamental problem with
the quality control requirement as its "inconsistent treatment of licensing and non-licensing
trademark owners." Id. at 536. In a licensing situation, if the trademark owner fails to
exercise quality control, trademark licensing would create the danger that products bearing
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abandonment of the trademark by the owner. The purported reason for
the quality control requirement in trademark licensing is to protect the
61
consumer from confusion and deceit. In recent years, courts have less
rigorously applied the quality control requirement, and have been more
willing to find sufficient quality control in licensing arrangements where
"there were no written standards available to be used during inspection
of the licensee, no written reports documenting alleged inspections by
licensor's representatives, and no evidence that the licensee had a quality
control program which the licensor could rely on." 62 With the relaxation
of the quality control requirement, the trademark owner can satisfy the
quality control requirement by choosing numerous available means to
maintain either direct or indirect control of the licensees' use of the
licensed trademarks.6
C.

Trademarksand the Internet

The Internet has become a powerful medium of global communication
and commerce." There are more than 650 million users worldwide 6s and

the same trademark might be of diverse quality. Id. But in "an ordinary non-licensing
situation, the trademark owner has no duty to prevent diversity in the quality of the goods
bearing his trademark." Id. (quoting William R. Woodward, Some Observationson Legitimate
Control of the Nature and Quality of the Goods, 49 TRADEMARK REP. 609, 611 (1959)).
' Elizabeth C. Bannon, The Growing Risk of Self-Dilution, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 570, 578
(1992).
1 Under direct control, as suggested by a commentator, the trademark licensor may
choose one or more of the following:
a.
Supplying proper use guidelines to licensees, such as "style guides" or creating
the actual artwork to be used: the advent of computer graphic files and
downloading from the Internet or a network makes this a simple methodology
that is easy to control;
b. Actual supply of products or ingredients, or in the case of services, management
and technical assistance;
c.
Approving samples, etc. at various stages of design and manufacture;
d. Visiting licensee's facilities and/or approving sublicensees and contract
manufacturers chosen by the licensee;
e.
Reviewing quality control tests; and
f.
Acting on consumer/user complaints
Steven M. Weinberg, Overview of the Law and Business of Licensing Intellectual Property in
2002, 629 PLI/Pat 9, 18-19 (2002).
Under indirect control, the trademark owner may delegate the responsibility to an
independent agent that is not the licensee or appoint the licensee as the quality control
agent. Id. Courts have upheld indirect control practice in cases where the licensor is not
familiar with or has no experience in the manufacturing and marketing of the licensed
products. Id. (citing Winnebago Indus., Inc. v. Oliver & Winston, Inc., 207 U.S.P.Q. 335
(TTAB1980)).
' A. Michael Froomkin, Habermas@discourse.net: Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace,
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more than one billion publicly readable web pages available on the
rapidly evolving Internet.6 Presently, in the .com Top-Level-Domain
("TLD") alone, there are more than twenty-three million active domain
67
names.
Domain names are the easily remembered version of the complex
numerical Internet Protocol addresses. 6' Domain names were introduced
to facilitate and encourage Internet use.769
They link users to the global
communication and commerce network. 0

116 HARV. L. REV. 749, 782 (2003) ("What had once been the preserve of computer science
and electrical engineering departments, and of computer nerds, now raises legal, social,
and commercial policy questions ranging from pricing to privacy.").
' Global Reach provides global Internet statistics on population and language.
See http://www.global-reach.biz/globstats/
(last visited Mar. 4, 2004); see also
www.nua.com/surveys/howmanyonline/index.html (reporting that as of September
2002 there were 605.6 million users worldwide). In the United States, more than 72 percent
of Americans are on the World Wide Web. Hugh Calkins, Maine Lawyer Websites: The
Good, the Bad and the Ugly, 18 ME. BAR J. 78, 79 (2003). Further, about 60 percent of the U.S.
population use the Internet. Id.
" See Froomkin, supra note 64, at 782 (noting growth of web pages and Internet data
traffic worldwide).
67 See
Whois Source, Detailed Domain Counts and Internet Statistics, at
www.whois.sc/internet-statistics/ (providing chart of daily domain statistics in several
TLDs) (last visited Mar. 4, 2004).
Stacey H. King, The "Law That It Deems Applicable": ICANN, Dispute Resolution, and
the Problem of Cybersquatting, 22 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 453, 457-58 (2002). The
domain name is described as follows:
In order for these networks to communicate with one another, every computer
linked to another has a numeric address assigned to it. This number is similar to
a telephone number, and other computers use this number to route messages to
it. The number, for example 123.456.789.23, is called an Internet Protocol, or I
address. These IP addresses are, due to their length, often hard to remember,
particularly as the Internet has grown and the number of computers and
commercial sites linked to the Internet have also expanded.
Id.; see also Jennifer Dupre, A Solution to the Problem? Trademark Infringement and Dilution by
Domain Names: Bringing Cyberworld in Line with the "Real" World, 87 TRADEMARK REP. 613,
614 (1997) (describing domain names).
I Each computer connected to the Internet is often referred to as a "host" or "hosts."
As of January 1, 2003, there are about 171,638,297 hosts worldwide. Internet System
Consortium, Internet Domain Survey, at http://www.isc.org/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2004). To
facilitate the communications among hosts, each host is assigned a numerical Internet
Protocol address that contains four groups of numbers separated by decimals. Since
Internet users find it difficult to remember complex numerical addresses, the Domain
Name System was introduced to assign alphabetical values to the numbers. See generally
Zohar Efroni, The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act and the Uniform Dispute
Resolution Policy: New Opportunitiesfor InternationalForum Shopping? 26 COLuM.-VLA J.L &
ARTS 335, 336 (2002).
" See generally Dupre, supra note 68, at 614; Efroni, supra note 69, at 336; King, supra
note 68, at 457-58.
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A company wishing to establish its presence in the Internet to offer
goods, products, or services, must register its website's domain name.71
To register a domain name, a company must first determine under
There are
which TLD the domain name should be registered.7
73
party
a
third
If
TLD.
.com
is
the
popular
most
numerous TLDs, but the
a
choose
may
company
has already registered the domain name, the
different domain name in the same TLD or register its original domain
name in a different TLD. 74
A company that owns protected trademarks may register its
trademarks as domain names in an attempt to reach the Internet
audience.m In fact, users often search for Internet companies by using
trademarks or company names. 76 An Internet company that does not
own any trademark at the outset may seek protection for its domain
names under trademark law by registering domain names as trademarks
with the United States Trademark Office.
Look, Law and Order on the Wild, Wild West (WWW), 24 U. ARK. L1rrLE ROCK
71 Jeffrey J.
L. REV. 817, 844 (2002) (stating that start-up companies built their Internet presence through
having simple, highly descriptive domain names); Neil Batavia, Comment, That Which We
Call a Domain by Any Other Name Would Smell As Sweet: The Overbroad Protection of
TrademarkLaw As It Applies to Domain Names on the Internet, 53 S.C. L. REV. 461, 464 n.35
(2002) ("Domain names offer a global presence on the Internet.").
See generally New TLD Program, ICANN, at http://www.icann.org/tlds (last visited
Mar. 4, 2004). In the 1980s, seven TLDs (.com, .edu, .gov, .int, .mil, .net, and .org) were
created and domain name registrations were permitted in .com, .net, and org without
restriction. Seven more TLDs were introduced in 2001 and 2002. They are .biz, info,
.name, pro, aero, .coop, and .museum. Id.
Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Fool Us Once Shame on You -Fool Us Twice Shame on
Us: What We Can Learn From the Privatizations of the Internet Backbone Network and the
Domain Name System, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 89, 198 (2001) (stating that popular .com TLD is
overcrowded); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Going Private: Technology, Due Process, and Internet
Dispute Resolution, 34 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 151, 159 n.27 (2000) (noting that there are over
two hundred country code TLDs, but only seven generic TLDs). Of these seven, .com is
among the most popular. Id.
' See Puneet Singh, Gateway Pages: A Solution to the Domain Name Conflict?, 91
TRADEMARK REP. 1226, 1235 (2001) (noting that under Domain Name System, Aquarius
Haircuts cannot register its desired domain name "aquarius" in .com TLD and is forced to
choose another domain name such as "aquarius.net" or "aquariushair.com").
'
See Gilwit, supra note 28, at 267 (stating that "using trademarks as domain names
helps businesses to create a strong presence on the Internet.").
76 See Daniel Janis, Internet Domain Names and the Lanham Act: Broadening Trademark
Definitions and Their Implicationsfor Speech on the Web, 25 COLUM.-VLA J. L. & ARTS 21, 35-36
(2001) (discussing common practice by Internet companies who register trademarks as
domain names to assist users to reach companies' websites); Tamarah Belczyk, Note,
Domain Names: The Special Case of Personal Names, 82 B.U. L. REV. 485, 491 (2002)
(commenting that Internet users often search for web site by entering name or trademark
followed by .com).
' See Deborah Howitt, War.Coin: Why The Battles Over Domain Names Will Never Cease,
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As a domain name, however, the life of the protected trademark is
dependent on the term of the domain name registration.7 A domain
name can be registered for one, two, five, or ten years.79 The term of
domain name registration is unregulated.'o When a registration expires,
others may register the domain name." In such cases, the domain name
passes to the third-party registrant, and the original trademark owner's
use of the domain name must cease. If the original trademark owner
wishes to protest the transfer, he or she must resort to international
arbitration 82 or litigation. 3 The original owner can retrieve the domain
19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 719, 731 (1997) (analyzing trademark registration for
domain names with Patent and Trademark Office as long as domain names meet
trademark requirements); see also Yasaman Navai, Note, Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman
Market Inc. - ProtectingAgainst Cybersquattingor Extending the Allowable Reach of Trademark
Law on the World Wide Web, 11 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 191, 195 (2001)
(noting that if Internet company obtains trademark registration for its domain name prior
to receiving cease and desist letter by third party trademark owner, Internet company may
continue to maintain its domain name).
The Patent and Trademark Office considers a domain name a trademark when it
serves as a "'source identifier' for services that are being offered on the Internet." Lois R.
Lupica, The Technology-Rich "Dot-Corn" in Bankruptcy: The Debtor as Owner of Intellectual
Property, 53 ME. L. REV. 361, 379 (2001) (referring to Patent and Trademark Office,
Examination Guide No. 2-99 (Sept. 29, 1999)).
78 Registral.com, LLC v. Fisher Controls Int'l, Inc., No. H-01-1423, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10002 (S.D. Tex. June 28, 2001) is illustrative. Fisher Controls had registered
numerous trademarks and had operated under the Fisher name since the 1880s. Fisher
Controls registered the domain name Fisher.com, but subsequently allowed the domain
name registration to lapse. Registral.com registered the Fisher.corn domain name two
minutes after it was made available to the public for registration. Fisher Controls later
attempted to obtain the domain name back through litigation. Id.
To avoid domain name registration lapse, Internet companies are advised to
periodically check registrations and calendar the expiration dates. Scott A. Bearby,
Marketing,Protectionand Enforcement of NCAA Marks, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 543, 545 (2002).
' See, e.g., Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 953
(C.D. Cal. 1997) (noting NSI charges initial two-year registration fee, and annual charges
starting in third year), affd, 194 F.3d 980, 981 (9th Cir. 1999); Network Solutions, Inc. v.
Umbro Int'l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 84 n.10 (Va. 2000) (noting domain name registrant can
obtain domain names for up to 10 years).
' See, e.g., Benjamin B. Cotton, Comment, Prospecting or Cybersquatting: Registering
Your Name Before Someone Else Does, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 287, 292-93 (2002) (explaining
that domain name registration is on first-come, first-serve basis, and that there is no
regulation of domain name registration except requirement to be bound by Uniform
Dispute Resolution Policy).
"' A. Michael Froomkin & Mark A. Lemley, ICANN and Antitrust, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV.
1, 65 (2003) (stating that there is market for domain names that have expired and are not
renewed).
82 See generally Michael Geist, Fair.com?: An Examination of the Allegations of Systemic
Unfairness in the ICANN UDRP, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L. L. 903 (2002); Pamela Segal, Attempts to
Solve the UDRP'S Trademark Holder Bias: A Problem That Remains Unsolved Despite the
Introduction of New Top Level Domain Names, 3 CARDOZO ONLINE J. CONFLICT. RESOL. 1
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name upon proof that the registrant registered the domain name in bad
faith.4
A trademark in the form of a domain name registration may be
characterized as either a license,5 a service contract,8 or intangible87
with, some document.
property that is neither merged in, nor identified
The prevailing view today on domain name classification is that domain
names are intangible property that can be sold, assigned, and
Domain names can be used as collateral property in
transferred.'

(2001); Lisa M. Sharrock, The Future of Domain Name Dispute Resolution: Crafting Practical
InternationalLegal Solutions From Within the UDRP Framework,51 DuKE L.J. 817 (2001).
See generally Adam Silberlight, Domain Name Disputes Under the ACPA in the New
Millennium: When is Bad Faith Intent to Profit Really Bad Faith and Has Anything Changed With
the ACPA's Inception?, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 269 (2002); Jian Xiao,
The First Wave of Cases Under the ACPA, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 159 (2002).
See generally Registral.com, LLC v. Fischer Controls Int'l, Inc., No. H-01-1423, 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10002 (S.D. Tex. June 28, 2001) (holding that domain name registrant
obtained domain name in bad faith in violation of Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection
Act).

I Francis G. Conrad, Dot.coms in Bankruptcy Valuations Under Title 11 or www.snipehunt
in the Dark.noreorg/noassets.com, 9 AM. BANKR. L. INST. REV. 417, 430 (2001) (analyzing
domain names as licenses).
See, e.g., Dorer v. Arel, 60 F. Supp. 2d 558 (E.D. Va. 1999); Network Solutions, Inc. v.
Umbro Int'l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80 (Va. 2000).
87 Kremen v. Cohen, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1173 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (rejecting classification
of domain names as service contracts because right to use domain names "exists separate
and apart from [domain name registrar's] various services that make domain names
operational Internet addresses [as these] services are ...mere conditions subsequent" and
holding domain names intangible property).
The Ninth Circuit has recently certified questions for a California state court to
answer regarding the tort of conversion of domain names. The Ninth Circuit asked:
Is an Internet domain name within the scope of property subject to the tort of
conversion? (a) For the tort of conversion to apply to intangible property, is it
necessary that the intangible property be merged with a document or other
tangible medium? (b) If the answer to Question (a) is "yes," does the tort of
conversion apply to an Internet domain name, or, more specifically, is an Internet
domain name merged with a document or other tangible medium?
Kremen v. Cohen, 325 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2003); see, e.g., Eric Kohm, When "Sex" Sells:
Expanding the Tort of Conversion to Encompass Domain Names, 23 LOy. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 443
(2003); Mike Tonsing, "Webjacking" Case Stirs Interest in Ninth Circuit, 50 FED. LAW. 16, 18
(2003).
See Kremen v. Cohen, 2000 WL 1811403, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2000) (finding
domain names are form of intangible property that can be owned and transferred to others

for value); Warren E. Agin, Workouts and Bankruptcy in the E-commerce Economy, 846

PLI/Comm 379, 445-450 (2003) (analyzing domain names as intangible property); see also

Alexis Freeman, Internet Domain Name Security Interests: Why Debtors Can Grant Them and
Lenders Can Take Them in This New Type of Hybrid Property, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 853
(2002).
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secured transactions.8 9 Domain names are often among the most
valuable property of a bankrupt estate. 90
II.
A.

THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BANKRUPTCY PARADIGM

The Exclusion of TrademarksFrom IntellectualProperty Bankruptcy

Current bankruptcy law distinguishes between trademarks and other
types of intellectual property such as patents, trade secrets, and
copyrights. 91 While the law recognizes patents, trade secrets, and
copyrights as intellectual property and accords them special protection,
trademarks are excluded from this protected intellectual property
status. 9' Specifically, a licensee of patents, trade secrets, or copyrights
has a right to continue to use the intellectual property after the bankrupt
licensor has rejected 93 the license agreement in a bankruptcy
proceeding.94 Under bankruptcy law, a bankrupt licensor can elect to

See Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Commercial Law Collides with Cyberspace: The Trouble with
Perfection -Insecurity Interests in the New CorporateAsset, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 37, 74-75
(2002) (proposing methods of perfecting security interest in domain names in secured
transactions).
' A. Mechele Dickerson, From leans to Genes: The Evolving Nature of Property of the
Estate, 15 BANKR. DEV. J. 285, 304 (1998) (commenting that domain names and other
intangible property are now part of bankruptcy estate); Farah Z. Usmani, Note, Information
Privacy and Internet Company Insolvencies: When a Business Fails, Does Divestiture or
Bankruptcy Better Protect the Consumer?, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 273, 276 (2003)
(stating that for many e-commerce businesses that are in financial trouble, among their
most valuable assets are domain names and customer lists).
" See Patrick Law, Intellectual PropertyLicenses and Bankruptcy -Has the IPLBA Thawed
the "Chilling Effects" of Lubrizol v. Richmond Metal Finishers, 99 COMPUTER/L.J. 261, 271
(1994) (explaining reasons for exclusion of trademarks from bankruptcy protection
available for other types of intellectual property); Joseph H. Smolinsky, The Treatment of
Trademarks and Trademark Licenses in Bankruptcy, 744 PLI/Pat 225, 249 (2003) (stating that
trademarks are excluded from bankruptcy protection available for other forms of
intellectual property).
' See generally Stuart M. Riback, The Interface of Trademarks and Bankruptcy, 6 No. 6 J.
PROPRIETARY RTs. 2, 6 (1994) (stating that under bankruptcy law "intellectual property"
includes only patents, copyrights, trade secrets, and semi-conductor chip mask works);
Smolinsky, supra note 91, at 248 (noting that definition for intellectual property does not
include trademarks).
9' See Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contractsin Bankruptcy: Understanding "Rejection,"
59 U. COLO. L. REV. 845, 919 (1988) (stating that rejection of license is treated as if licensor
debtor has broken promise and will not perform its obligations).
See Richard M. Cieri et al., ProtectingTechnology and Intellectual Property Rights When
a Debtor Infringes on Those Rights, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 349, 355-56 (2000) (explaining
that licensee has two options: it may decide to treat license as terminated and assert claim
for breach of contract damages or it may choose to retain its licensed rights in intellectual
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reject, that is, to breach, the license agreement by effectively severing the
license grant.9 5 The bankruptcy law's special protection shields patent,
trade secret, and copyright licensees from the impact of such rejection.
The licensee of a trademark, however, has no such special protection; it
cannot use the trademark after the bankruptcy licensor rejects the
trademark license agreement.96
Thus, when a licensor in bankruptcy rejects a trademark license, the
licensee is forced to discontinue all use of the trademark in connection
with the sale of its goods or services and in the daily operation of its
business.97 All trademark use must come to an abrupt end.9 The
trademark licensee's only right is an unsecured claim for money
damages against the debtor or the trustee of the bankrupt licensor's
estate. 99
At the opposite end of the spectrum, a licensee of patents, copyrights,
or trade secrets can continue to operate its business without interruption
when the licensor rejects the license in bankruptcy. 10° The licensee may
continue to use the license rights granted under the patent, copyright, or
trade secret license to make, use, or sell its products or services,
incorporating the protected inventions, copyrights, or know-how.1 '
property and continue to pay royalty fees to licensor debtor).
9' See Brent Capehart, How Bankruptcy Can Affect a Client's Intellectual Property Rights, 38
ARK. L. REV. 20, 22 (2003) (stating that rejection of license agreement means agreement is
"breached (but generally not automatically terminated) and the non-debtor party has a prepetition claim for that breach of contract").
' See generally Law, supra note 91, at 271.
"7 See David Jenkins, Comment, Licenses, Trademarks, and Bankruptcy, Oh My!:
Trademark Licensing and the Perils of Licensor Bankruptcy, 25 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 143, 157-58
(1991) (stating that trademark licensee loses its right to use trademark in its business in
post-rejection).
" See Riback, supra note 92, at 66 (stating that rejection of trademark license can
potentially destroy licensee's business because it is deemed to be pre-petition breach by
licensor debtor); see also In re Blackstone Potato Chip Co., Inc., 109 B.R. 557, 562 (Bankr. D.
R.I. 1990) (stating that upon rejection, licensee was left with no rights to use trademark).
" See Andrew, supra note 93, at 919 (stating that upon licensor debtor's rejection, nondebtor licensee has basis for breach of contract claim for damages under bankruptcy law);
see also In re Centura Software Corp., 281 B.R. 660, 673 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that
in post-rejection, trademark licensee is only entitled to file unsecured pre-petition claim for
damages resulting from inability to use licensed trademarks).
" See generally Scott A. Steinberg & Michael A. Gerber, Software Licensing: Protecting
Intellectual Property in Bankruptcy, 6 BANKR. L. & PRAc. 535, 544-45 (1997) (stating that
software licensees can retain their right to use software after licensor debtor rejected
license); Robert T. Caravan, Comment, Recent Trends in Bankruptcy Law, 21 SETON HALL L.
REV. 800, 803 (1991) (stating that licensees of technology are permitted to continue their use
of technology for term of license, notwithstanding rejection).
1" See Tony K. Ho & Sujun Kim, Intellectual PropertyIssues in an Insolvency Context, 1307
PLI/Corp 173, 185-86 (2002) (stating that licensee has unimpeded use of licensed
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This discrepancy in the treatment of trademarks on the one hand, and
patents, copyrights, and trade secrets on the other, seems to indicate that
trademarks are not as esteemed as patents, copyrights, and trade
secrets. 1 2 Such treatment suggests that the use of trademarks in
commerce is not as important as the use of the other three types of
intellectual property. 10 3 This discrepancy also suggests that a disruption
in trademark use is not as harmful as a disruption in the use of patents,
trade secrets, or copyrights.1°4 The decision to systematically exclude
trademarks from the special treatment reserved only for the other three
suggests that it was formed in hasteja under the banner of societal
benefits. 1 6 The perplexing and polemic decision is embodied in the
Intellectual Property Licenses in Bankruptcy Act.

intellectual property after licensor debtor rejects license agreement). Further, the licensor
debtor is obligated to turn over any intellectual property or embodiment thereof to which
the licensee is entitled under the license or any supplementary agreement. The licensor
must also refrain from interfering with the licensee's rights under the license or any
supplementary agreement if the licensee makes this request in writing. Id.
1" See Cieri, supra note 94, at 355-56 (stating that bankruptcy law provides protection to
licensees of patents, copyrights, and trade secrets because law wants to promote
development and licensing of these intellectual property rights since these rights are
necessary for licensees to operate substantial parts of their businesses).
10 In deciding to exclude trademarks from the protection, Congress focused on the
impact of the licensing of technology such as patents, copyrights, and trade secrets. This
suggests that the license of trademarks in commerce is not as important and thus not
worthy of the same protection. See Noreen Wiggins, Note, The Intellectual Property
Bankruptcy ProtectionAct: The Legislative Response to Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond
Metal Finishers, Inc., 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 603, 620 (1990) (explaining
legislative purposes of bankruptcy protection statute for certain forms of intellectual
property).
"04As commentators have noted, protection is available for patents, copyrights, and
trade secrets to prevent the destruction of the licensee's business. The explicit exclusion of
trademarks from the same protection strongly suggests that such exclusion does not cause
the same level of destruction to the licensee's business. See Randy Michelson, Bankruptcy &
Licensing, 704 PLI/Pat 247, 261 (2002) (stating that protection available for licensees of
patents, copyrights, and trade secrets is to prevent destruction of businesses dependent
upon bankruptcy licensors' intellectual property for success of its business operations).
" See infra Part V.
" Patents, copyrights, and trade secrets are protected because courts recognize that
licensing these rights both provides owners with monetary gain, and society with benefits
from technological development and innovation. Thus, allowing the licensees to continue
to use the licenses in post-rejection encourages the development of technology and
innovation. See Law, supra note 91, at 264 (explaining how protection afforded licensees of
patents, copyrights, and trade secrets will encourage investment in intellectual property
and reverse any chilling effect on development and licensing of intellectual property);
Wiggins, supra 103, at 620 (explaining how licensing arrangements benefit both industry
and society; rejection of arrangements would have chilling effect on technological
development).
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The Intellectual Property Licenses in Bankruptcy Act

Congress passed the Intellectual Property Licenses in Bankruptcy Act
("the Act") in October 1988107 in response to the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals' decision in Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers,
The Lubrizol court authorized the debtor licensor's unilateral
Inc.
rejection of a license agreement concerning metal coating process
technology.1"9 Under then current bankruptcy law, the licensee could
treat the rejection as a breach and seek monetary damages, but could not
retain its license rights in the technology by demanding specific
performance."0 Essentially, rejection extinguished the licensee's right to
use the technology."' The denial of the right to use the technology
112
license threatened the licensee's business. Lubrizol's harsh outcome led
to passage of the IPLBA."'
The IPLBA is designed to promote the development and licensing of
intellectual property by preventing the rejection of a license from
unilaterally terminating the rights of an intellectual property licensee to
use the licensed property."4 In passing the IPLBA, Congress also sought
to encourage investment in intellectual property and to protect the rights
of technology licensees who contribute significantly to the financing,
research, development, manufacturing, and marketing of intellectual

1 Intellectual Property Licenses in Bankruptcy Act, Pub. L. No. 100-506, 102 Stat. 2538
(1988) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2000)).
1- 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986). See generally Wiggins,
supra note 103, at 603 (discussing Lubrizol and Congress' response).
'" Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1048 (recognizing harsh result of its holding and stating that
Congress had afforded special treatment for certain types of executory contracts under
Bankruptcy Code, but that Code did not contain any comparable treatment of technology
licenses).
"' See id. (stating that applicable bankruptcy provision only allowed limited monetary
damages, but not specific performance for non-bankrupt party in post-rejection).
...Id. (stating that licensee could not continue to use technology because such use
would undercut core purpose of rejection under bankruptcy law).
"' The Lubrizol court acknowledged that the consequences to the licensee were harsh
and might have a chilling effect upon the willingness of licensees to contract at all with
licensors in financial difficulties. Id. The court stated, "Congress has plainly provided for
the rejection of executory contracts, notwithstanding the obvious adverse consequences for
contracting parties thereby made inevitable." Id.
See Richard M. Cieri & Michelle M. Morgan, Licensing Intellectual Property and
13
Technology From the Financially-Troubled or Startup Company: Prebankruptcy Strategies to
Minimize the Risk in a Licensee's Intellectual Property and Technology Investment, 55 Bus. LAW.
1649, 1652 (2000) (stating that statute was enacted to correct detrimental impact that
Lubrizol and progeny have had on technology industry).
"4 See H.R. REP. No. 100-1012, at 6 (1988) (explaining purpose of legislation); S. REP.
No. 100-505, at 1 (1988) (stating purpose of bill).
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property." 5
The IPLBA provides special protection to intellectual property
licensees when the debtor licensor is in bankruptcy. The IPLBA permits
a licensee to retain its right under a license even when the debtor
6
licensors files a bankruptcy petition and decides to reject the license.1
The IPLBA defines intellectual property as: (a) trade secret, (b)
invention, process, design, or plant protected under Title 35, (c) patent
application, (d) plant variety, (e) work of authorship protected under
Title 17, or (f) mask work protected under Chapter 9 of Title 17.117 The
definition of intellectual property deliberately excludes trademarks."8
The immediate concerns that gave rise to the IPLBA are perhaps

responsible for the omission of trademarks from the Act's protection.

9

115 S. REP. No. 100-505, at 3-4 (1988) (explaining role of licensing and how then-current
bankruptcy law harmed licensors and licensees); see also Law, supra note 91, at 264
(discussing how bankruptcy protection statute for intellectual property would provide
licensees with incentives to invest in development, manufacturing, and marketing of
intellectual property).
116 The IPLBA has been codified as 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)
(2000).
"' The definition of intellectual property in the IPLBA has been codified as 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(35A) (2003).
.. The Senate Report accompanying S. 1626 states that "the bill does not address the
rejection of executory trademark, trade name or service mark licenses." S. REP. NO. 100-

505, at 5 (1988). See generally WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., BANKRUPTCY LAW & PRACTICE 39:57

(2002) (stating that Bankruptcy Code defines intellectual property broadly to protect many
types of rights other than trademarks); Warren E. Agin, Drafting the Intellectual Property
License: Bankruptcy Considerations,9 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 591 (2000) (stating that section
365(n) of Bankruptcy Code does not provide protections for licensees of trademarks); Mary
William, Survey: The Treatment of Intellectual Property Interests in Bankruptcy, 4 J. BANKR. L.
& PRAc. 391, 397 (1995) (explaining definition of intellectual property includes virtually all
types of intellectual property protected by federal, state, statutory, and common law;
though one must interpret definition liberally, trademarks, trade names, and publicity
rights are not included in definition).
"9 Legislative history of the IPLBA indicates that Congress became concerned about
the treatment of intellectual property licenses under bankruptcy law largely due to the
Lubrizol case and the awareness that the "high technology industry... is... so vital to our
nation's economy." Intellectual Property Contracts in Bankruptcy: Hearing on H.R. 4657 Before
the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law, 100th Cong. 10 (1988) [hereinafter Hearings]
(statement of Rep. Peter W. Rodino, Jr. Chairman, Subcomm. on Monopolies and
Commercial Law).
Likewise, Representative Don Edwards, who introduced H.R. 4657, raised similar
concerns about technology licenses:
I introduced this bill last month because of my concerns about the need for
continued licensing of intellectual property rights and about the chill on the free
flow of intellectual property created under the bankruptcy code by recent court
decisions.
As we all know from the new products and services that crop up in our daily
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The Lubrizol decision, which prompted Congress' passage of the IPLBA,
focused on technology. It is not surprising, then, that the Act protected
the licensees of intellectual property defined only as patents, trade
secrets, and copyrights. These forms of intellectual property may have
simply overshadowed trademarks during the passage of IPLBA. Indeed,
the House Report indicates that Congress was preoccupied with "the
need to foster the development of new technology and new ideas, and to
maintain the United States' world leadership in the area of new
technology development."' 20 Congress recognized that in the technology
licensing context, licensees "use the licensed technology as the basis for
an entire business," and if the licensor rejected the license agreement and
withdrew the technology, the licensees would be left without the
technology and possibly would be unable to obtain adequate substitute
Such immediate concerns with technology resulted in
technology.
legislation to protect the licensees of technology and ideas, even when
the bankrugt licensor has expressly decided not to honor the license
In summary, the IPLBA was a reaction to the Lubrizol
agreement.

lives, we are in the midst of a technological revolution. Over the past 40 years,
the American economy has thrived on the development of new ideas and
inventions. Frequently, this new technology makes its way into the marketplace
through intellectual property licensing agreements, with the business, university,
or individual entrepreneur who developed that intellectual property granting a
license to someone else to use or market it. Entire businesses may be built upon
the intellectual property licensed from other parties.
Recent decisions under the bankruptcy laws, however, put this system of
licensing into jeopardy by threatening a licensee's continued use of intellectual
property after the licensor files bankruptcy.
Of particular concern is the decision in Lubrizol Enterprise,Inc. v. Richmond Metal
Finishers,Inc.
Id. (statement of Rep. Don Edwards).
H.R. 4657 was later amended and Representative Edwards introduced a clean bill,
H.R. 5348, which the House subsequently passed on October 4, 1988. See H.R. REP. No.
100-1012, at 1-2 (1988) (stating procedural background of H.R. 5348).
12 H.R. REP. No. 100-1012, at 4 (explaining background of bill).
Id. at 6 (illustrating example of computer manufacturer licensee that faced serious
consequences of licensor's rejection).
12 See S. REP. No. 100-505, at 3 (1988) ("Licensing of technology, which the bill is
intended to protect and facilitate, plays a substantial role in the process of technological
development and innovation."); see also Madlyn Gleich Primoff & Erica G. Weinberger, Ecommerce and Dot-com Bankruptcies: Assumption, Assignment and Rejection of Executory
Contracts, Including Intellectual Property Agreements, and Related Issues Under Section 365(c),
365(e) and 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 307, 342-43 (2000)
(stating that while IPLBA permits licensee to retain the intellectual property license that

1292

University of California,Davis

[Vol. 37:1267

decision. It merely responded to the then perceived chilling effects
Lubrizol would have had on the licensee's right to use the technology
license. The Act ignored the licensee's right to use a trademark license.
Congress expressed only a passing concern for the exclusion of
trademarks from the IPLBA's protection.1 Legislative history indicates
that Congress recognized the importance of trademark licenses. 124
Congress admitted that the rejection of trademark licenses is "of
concern" because of the harsh interpretation of section 365 by the
Lubrizol court.'2 Congress, however, avoided addressing this concern,
stating, in the words of the legislative report, that "since these matters
could not be addressed without more extensive study, it was determined
to postpone Congressional action in this area." 126
Not only did Congress postpone its decision to address the concerns
relating to the rejection of trademarks by debtor-licensors, it
conveniently passed the ball to the bankruptcy courts. 27 The legislative
history indicates that Congress wanted the bankruptcy courts to develop
"equitable treatment of this situation. " 128 Because congressional concerns
regarding the exclusion of trademarks from bankruptcy protection is
imbedded in the legislative history, while the plain language of the
IPLBA indicates the explicit exclusion of trademarks, a bankruptcy court
considering the rejection of a trademark license is in a difficult situation.
It may decide that it is bound by the plain language of the IPLBA and
summarily authorize the rejection of the trademark license, thereby
extinguishing the licensee's right to use the trademark. 129 Alternately, it
may give weight to Congress' concerns regarding the exclusion of
trademarks, and conclude that permitting the licensee to retain the use of

existed pre-petition, it does not permit licensee to post-rejection enforcement of licensor
debtor's ongoing obligations to provide service, maintenance, future upgrades, and
improvements of intellectual property per original license agreement).
' See S. REP. No. 100-505, at 5.
124

Id.

Id. (stating that rejection of trademark, trade name, or service mark license by debtor
licensors "is of concern because of the interpretation of section 365 by the Lubrizol court and
others").
26 Id. (explaining that concerns relating to rejection of trademark licenses are "beyond
the scope of this legislation").
127 Id.
12

'2

Id.

See generally In re Centura Software Corp., 281 B.R. 514 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993)
(applying plain meaning of section 365(n) and declining to conduct judicial inquiry into
legislative history); In re Blackstone Potato Chip Co., Inc., 109 B.R. 557 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1990)
(ignoring section 365(n) and authorizing rejection of trademark license agreement).
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the trademark falls within the court's equitable powers."" This latter
approach would rest on the belief that even though the plain language of
the IPLBA excludes the protection of trademark licenses, the bankruptcy
to use the trademark license if
court can allow the licensees to continue
13 1
the court deems the use to be equitable.
Yet another bankruptcy court, however, may decide that weighing the
equities depends on the licensee's timeliness in raising its concern to the
court.1 32 If the licensee raises its concern pre-rejection, the court may be
more inclined to consider the matter, particularly if the trademark
license is part of a bundle of rights to use with other intellectual property
If the licensee raises its concern postprotected under the IPLBA.
rejection, the court may rule that it has no choice but to apply the strict
language of the IPLBA, and exclude the trademark from protection
34
All of
because the trademark license itself has already been rejected.
and
licensee,
the
debtor,
the
parties
concerned
that
all
this indicates
cases
bankruptcy
in
the unsecured creditors - are on uncertain ground
involving debtor trademark licensors.
C.

Intellectual Property Paradigm-Patents, Trade Secrets, and Copyrights
Only

The plain language of the IPLBA creates an intellectual property
paradigm in which only patents, trade secrets, and copyrights are
protected. 30 Are there some qualities unique to patents, copyrights, and
" See generally In re Matusalem & Matusa of Fla., Inc., 158 B.R. 514, 516 (Bankr. N.D.
Fla. 1993) (stating that legislative history of IPLBA "is helpful in more fully understanding
legislation. Such a look in this case does help decide the issue. Thus the ball is back in the
Court's court. The court is impressed by the stated purpose of the Bill, the similarity of
provisions of the Code as to the treatment of lessors and lessees, and in this situation, the
plain language of 365(n).").
131 Id.
131 See In re Centura Software, 281 B.R. at 670 (discussing importance of timing when
trademark licensee raises their concern to court and dictates what court can consider in prerejection and post-rejection motion brought by trademark licensee).
" See id.
" See id. (stating that court is bound by plain language of IPLBA and could not
consider equity argument raised by trademark licensee in post-rejection motion).
" Congress believed that patents, copyrights, and trade secrets were the types of
intellectual property crucial to the advancement of technology, and legislation to protect
the licenses of these rights was immediate. See generally H.R. REP No. 100-1012, at 4 (1988)
("[T]he Committee is persuaded that the overall interests of the economy are best served by
creating another exception to section 365 now."); S. REP. No. 100-505, at 9 (1988) ("This bill
is intended to restore confidence in the system of intellectual property licensing, and courts
interpreting it should be sensitive to the reasonable practices that have and will evolve
among parties seeking to add to the technological and creative wealth of America.").
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trade secrets that merit the special protection? Do certain forms of
intellectual property deserve more protection because they are grounded
in the Constitution? Do the different characteristics of the various forms
of intellectual property justify the intellectual property paradigm?
Both copyrights and patents have a constitutional basis. The United
States Constitution expressly provides that for a limited time writers and
inventors receive protection for their writings and inventions,
respectively.13 The Constitution, however, does not contain any clauses
specifically addressing trade secrets. 137
Copyright law protects a broad range of original works of authorship,
including literary, musical, and architectural works, as well as computer
software codes. 138 A copyright provides the author 39 a bundle of rights
such as the right to reproduce the work, to make derivative works, to
distribute copies, to display the work, and to perform the work. 140 The
term of a copyright is the life of the author plus seventy years.141 If the
work is a work for hire,14 the term of such copyright is ninety-five years

'3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.").
" See Lars Smith, Trade Secrets in Commercial Transactions and Bankruptcy, 40 IDEA 549,
551 (2000) (discussing trade secret protection under uniform model statute).
13
Copyright law extends protections to works of authorship in eight broad categories
such as: (1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3)
dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic
works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other
audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works. See 17 U.S.C. § 102
(2000) (listing works of authorship for copyright protection). Copyright protection is also
available for software. See generally Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 825
F. Supp. 340 (D. Mass. 1993) (considering copyright infringement of software); Stephen M.
McJohn, The Paradoxes of Free Software, 9 GEo. MASON L. REV. 25, 36 (2000) (discussing
aspects of computer software entitled to copyright protection).
'" Under copyright law, authors can be individuals or corporations. See Jane Ginsburg,
The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1063, 1069 (2003)
(examining legal concept of authorship under various copyright laws).
40 See generally Todd Hagins, Grabbing Peter Gabriel to Pay Paul's Dinner: Plunder, the
Free Market, and the Fairness in Music Licensing Act, 7 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 385, 389-90 (2003)
(discussing statutory rights held by copyright owners); Brian Mencher, Digital
Transmissions: To Boldly Go Where No First Sale Doctrine Has Gone Before, 10 UCLA ENT. L.
REV. 47, 52 (2002) (listing rights included in copyright's bundle of rights under federal
copyright law).
14
See Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409, 413-17
(2002) (detailing evolving change in copyright term from Statute of Anne to Copyright
Term Extension Act).
14
A "work made for hire" is:

(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment;
or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a
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from registration or 120 years from creation, whichever is longer.
A patent is a negative right because under the law a patent owner has
only the right to exclude others from making, using, selling, or offering
for sale, or importing the patented invention." Patent protection lasts
for twenty years from the date the patent application is filed with the
Patent Office.
It is available to an invention that is novel' 46 and is not
147
obvious to a person with ordinary skill in the field of invention.'" The
subject matter eligible for patent protection is broad, ranging from
mechanical, to biotech, and even to methods of doing business,
otherwise known as Internet patents.' 49
collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a
translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text,
as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree
in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work
made for hire.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). See also Kwall, supra note 24, at 1000 (analyzing "work made for
hire" doctrine and how courts have interpreted it).
" See Irene Segal Ayers, The Future of Global Copyright Protection: Has Copyright Law
Gone too Far?, 62 U. Prrr. L. REV. 49, 73 (2000) (noting that Congress, for fourth time in
history of copyright law, extended copyright term and that under current law work-forhire has term of 95 years from registration); see also Jon M. Garon, Media & Monopoly in the
Information Age: Slowing the Convergence at the Marketplace of Ideas, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 491, 523 (1999) (stating that corporation authors of copyrights benefit most from
Copyright Term Extension Act under which such authors receive 20 more years to term of
95 years).
1"
See generally, Caroline Frances Barry, Chemical Claims Drafting After Lubrizol, 20 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 207, 227-28 (2002) (stating that under U.S. patent
system, patent grant is negative right); Janice Mueller, No "DilettanteAffair:" Rethinking the
Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L.
REV. 1, 50 (2001) (explaining that patentee has negative right to exclude others from using
patented invention, not affirmative right to use invention).
" See generally Donna M. Gitter, International Conflict Over Protecting Human DNA
Sequences in the U.S. & the European Union: An Argument for Compulsory Licensing & Fair Use
Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623, 1637 (2001) (discussing term of patent grant under U.S.
patent law).
" See, e.g., Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double Helix: A
Novel and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REV. 303,
384-88 (2002) (examining novelty requirement).
147 See, e.g., Margo A. Bagley, Patently Unconstitutional: The Geographical Limitation on
Prior Art in a Small World, 87 MINN. L. REV. 679, 694-95 (2003) (analyzing non-obviousness
requirement).
14
In addition to the novelty and non-obvious requirements, there are other
requirements such as patentable subject matter, utility, and enablement. See Arti K. Rai,
EngagingFacts and Policy: A Multi-InstitutionalApproach to Patent, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035,
1045 (2003) (discussing patentability requirements).
149 See generally Vincent Chiappetta, Defining the Proper Scope of Internet Patents: If We
Don't Know Where We Want to Go, We're Unlikely to Get There, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH.
L. REV. 289, 296-300 (discussing expansion of scope of patentable subject matter in recent

1296

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 37:1267

Protection for trade secrets began in the common law and was later
codified in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act 5 0 This Act gave the trade
secret owner a cause of action against misappropriation, if the
information or know-how qualifies as a trade secret and the owner has
protection against
safeguarded its secrecy.151 A trade secret enjoys S12
misappropriation as long as the owner safeguards it. In a trade secret
license arrangement, the licensor requires the licensee to execute a
confidentiality agreement and to follow certain measures to safeguard
153
secrecy.

years); Joel M. Freed & Thomas C. Reynold, The New Patent Landscape, in 18 No. 12
COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW. 1-3 (2001) (reviewing case law on subject matter of patent
protection).
" Historically, trade secrets have enjoyed protection under common law. See generally,
Matthew R. Millikin, Note, www.misappropriation.com: Protecting Trade Secrets After Mass
Dissemination on the Internet, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 931, 937 (2000) (providing brief history of
In 1979, the National Conference of
trade secret protection in United States).
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws began to promulgate a model state trade secrets
statute, the Uniform Trade Secret Act. See UNIF. TRADE SECRET ACT, 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990).
151 Misappropriation includes (i) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person
who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means;
or (ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied consent by a
person who
(A) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or
(B) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that his knowledge
of the trade secret was
I. derived from or through a person who had utilized improper means to acquire it;
II. acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit
its use; or
III. derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief
to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or
(C) before a material change of his or her position, knew or had reason to know that
it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been acquired by accident or
mistake.
UNIF. TRADE SECRET ACT § 1(2), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990).
152The secrecy requirement is integral to the protection of a trade secret, as seen in the
definition of trade secret. See id. (stating that trade secret is "information, including a
formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process that: (i)
derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known
to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by other persons who can obtain
economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.").
Such practice is part of the trade secret owner's efforts that are reasonable under the
1
circumstances to maintain its secrecy. See generally M. Scott McBride, Bioinformatics and
Intellectual Property Protection, 17 BERKELEY. TECH. L.J. 1331, 1353 (2002) (stating that
confidentiality agreement is often used to prevent contracting party from disclosing trade
secrets).
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Peculiarly, though they are excluded from the bankruptcy law's
definition of intellectual property, trademarks share many characteristics
T 4
Similar to the
possessed by copyrights, patents, and trade secrets.
negative right in patents, the owner of a trademark has the right to
In
exclude others from using a confusingly similar trademark.
addition, similar to trade secret protection, trademark protection is
116
Like trade secrets, trademark protection is
rooted in the common law.
not expressly included in the Constitution's clause for patent and
copyright protection.1 17 Interestingly, as in trade secret protection,
trademark protection is of indeterminate duration.5 8 Provided that the
trademark owner maintains its goodwill and reputation among
consumers through use of the trademark in commerce, the trademark is
protected as long as it is used.'59 Similar to copyright, patent, and trade
" Economists and legal scholars often treat patents, trade secrets, copyrights, and
trademarks as discrete and insular. Such treatment places the academic theory of
intellectual property at odds with the use of intellectual property in the real world.
Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 10, at 1457.
See generally
15 See id., at 1459 (discussing trademark owner's exclusionary right).
Adam Mossoff, What is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARTZ. L. REV. 371, 423
(2003) ("In the context of trademark law, the owners of trademarks were originally
accorded legal protection because the creation of trademarks represented the essence of
property rights, i.e., the marks were things used for value-creating purposes, which served
as the basis for an individual's entitlements to them and the exclusion of others.").
" See, e.g., The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) ("The trade-mark recognized
by the common law is generally the growth of a considerable period of use, rather than a
sudden invention.").
" See id. at 96 (holding that federal trademark statute in 1870 enacted under patent and
copyright clause of Constitution was unconstitutional).
" See Jon D. Grossman & Eric Oliver, Licensing Business Method Patents, 740 PLI/Pat
257, 266 (2003) ("The term for a trade secret is potentially indefinite."). Although the
protection for trademarks and trade secrets is rooted in common law, the law much more
readily treats trade secrets as "property." See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986,
1002-04 (1984) (ruling that trade secret is property because it has "many of the
characteristics of more tangible forms of property. A trade secret is assignable. A trade
secret can form the res of a trust, and it passes to a trustee in bankruptcy."). Trademark
law, on the other hand, protects both the consumer and the trademark owner who
substantially invested in the trademark and has the right to "reap the financial, reputationrelated rewards" of the trademark. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159,
163-64 (1995).
" See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94 (recognizing trademark right is based on use);
Davis J. Kera & Theodore H. Davis, Jr., The Fifty-Fifth Year of Administration of the Lanham
Trademark Act of 1946, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 197, 404 (2003) (explaining that statutory
abandonment of trademark occurs when trademark owner stops using trademark for
period of time); see also Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 10 at 1459 (stating that
trademark protection is infinite in duration because it lasts as long as companies establish
and maintain goodwill and preserve their reputation among consumers). If the non-use of
the trademark lasts three years, there is a presumption that the trademark owner has
abandoned its trademark. Kera & Davis, supra, at 404.
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secret protections, trademark protection allows the trademark owner to
obtain an injunction against unauthorized use of the trademark. 16 Like
copyrights, 16,patents, and trade secrets, 16 trademarks can be licensed
and assigned.'63 A trademark owner can sell its trademark to another
person or business entity along with the goodwill embodied in the
trademark.'6 The owner can use the trademark as collateral in secured
credit financing transactions.165 The owner can license the trademarks to
167
166
a third party, on either an exclusive 16 or non-exclusive basis.

11 See Int'l Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindelburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 919 (9th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981) ("[Tlhe 'property right' or protection accorded a
trademark owner can only be understood in the context of trademark law and its purposes.
A trademark owner has a property right only insofar as is necessary to prevent consumer
confusion as to who produced the goods and to facilitate differentiation of the trademark
owner's goods.").
1'
See Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Control Without Interest: State Law of Assignment, Federal
Preemption, and the Intellectual Property License, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8, 70 (2001) ("Intellectual
'property' in the form of patents and copyrights is intangible property granted by federal
statute, but the bundle of rights to the property can be owned like a chose in possession,
which can be assigned or exclusively conferred by license. On the other hand, a nonexclusive right is merely an executory right not to be sued."); Mark A. Lemley, Beyond
Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REv. 111, 144
(1999) (stating that copyright owner may license "less than her entire bundle of rights to a
licensee under terms consistent with the copyright laws").
162 See Grossman & Oliver, supra note 158, at 266-67 (noting that due to indefinable term
of trade secrets, "a patent license combined with trade secrets could conceivably lengthen
the term of the license beyond the lifetime of the patent"); cf. Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre,
701 F.2d 1365 (11th Cir. 1983) (ruling that package royalty payments for license of both
patent and trade secrets must fall when patent expires).
1"
See Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard Co., 273 U.S. 629, 632 (1927) (observing
that "the mark is property, protected and alienable, although as with other property, its
outline is shown only by the law of torts, of which the right is a prophetic summary."). To
avoid "naked license" of a trademark, a trademark owner must include a quality control
provision in the license agreement. See supra Part I(B);
see also Sharon R. Barner, Litigation
Perspective on Licensing, 672 PLI/Pat 647, 660-61 (analyzing "naked license" and discussing
trademark policy behind "naked license" rule).
1" The Lanham Act provides that the trademark owners can assign trademarks along
with the attached goodwill. 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (2000). See Mathias Strasser, The Rational Basis
of Trademark Protection Revisited: Putting the Dilution Doctrine into Context, 10 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 375, 418 (2000) (stating that under anti-assignment in gross
rule, trademark owner cannot assign its trademarks to third party without attached
goodwill).
16
See, e.g., In re Am.'s Hobby Ctr., 223 B.R. 275 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998) (trademarks as
collateral in secured transaction); In re Roman Cleanser, 43 B.R. 940 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1984) (same); In re TR-3 Indus., Inc., 41 B.R. 128 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1984) (same).
1
Under trademark law, an exclusive license of a trademark does not amount to a
transfer of ownership, whereas under copyright law, an exclusive license of any of the
exclusive rights under copyright is a transfer of ownership of that right. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)
(1978).
167 See Mary M. Squyres, Global Licensing: A License to Use, 740 PLI/Pat 485, 489 (2003)

2004]

Bankrupting Trademarks

1299

6
Moreover, as in patent, copyright, or trade secret licensing schemes,' 1
a trademark owner may also license its trademarks to others who have
the resources to use or market the intellectual property more
effectively.'69 A trademark owner may license the trademark to a
company that has manufacturing capability' 70 or resources for
marketing. 171 Commentators have noted that a trademark owner
sometimes finds that it is more advantageous to license its trademark
than to use the trademark itself.' 72
Given these similarities,7 3 it is unclear why the Intellectual Property
Bankruptcy Paradigm excludes trademarks but includes copyrights,
patents, and trade secrets. 74 Perhaps the Paradigm rests on the belief
that unlike the other three, trademark licenses require the licensor to

(acknowledging common practice of licensing by trademark owners). The licensing
practice offers the trademark owner more benefits than using the trademark itself. Id.
"The licensor can sell goods/services without advertising and simultaneously guarantee
the consumer a definite quality standard. Without the license, the licensee (user) would be
an infringer. The license establishes a continuous relationship between two parties." Id.
1" Congress recognized licensees' important role in technology licensing arrangements,
noting that the process of technological development and innovation "begins with an
inventive concept and must proceed through an expensive and risky series of steps
including research, development, manufacturing, and marketing. At each step, both
money and additional refinement of the idea are required. Often the financing and
additional refinements are only available through the participation of persons other than
the original innovator." S. REP. No. 100-505, at 3 (1988).
16 See Squyres, supra note 167, at 489-90 (explaining reasons for trademark licensing),
citing LADAS, supra note 46, at 1127.
1"6 See Squyres, supra note 167, at 490 (stating that licensee's manufacturing capability is
reason for licensing).
.7 Id. (noting that licensor does not have to pay for marketing expenses while goods or
services are offered for sale under licensor's trademarks).
1" Id. (explaining advantages gained by trademark owner if it chose to license its
trademarks).
1"2 As discussed elsewhere, trademarks are not "property" like patents, copyrights, and
trade secrets. Congress noted, however, one reason why it excluded trademarks from the
definition of intellectual property is that the licensing of trademarks requires a quality
control provision whereas the licensing of the other three types of intangible property does
not have a similar requirement. See infra Part V.
" The Hearing held by the Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law on
H.R. 4657 did not include any discussion of trademarks. The only reference to trademarks
appeared in a prepared statement by Thomas Hemnes, one of the four witnesses who
testified at the hearing. The subsequent report accompanying the amended bill H.R. 5348
did not contain any explanation why trademarks were excluded from the intellectual
property definition. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-1012 (1988).
The Senate had its own version of the intellectual property bankruptcy protection
bill, S. 1626. The report accompanying the bill contained a brief reference to trademarks
under the "Other Matters" subheading and in the "Section-by-Section Analysis." See
S. REP. No. 100-505, at 5, 7 (1988).
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exercise quality control. 175 As discussed infra Part V, such a belief is
contrary to the modem quality control practices for trademark and
should not serve as the reason for excluding trademarks from the
Paradigm.

III.

PERPETUATING THE PARADIGM

Since the creation of the Paradigm, bankruptcy courts have applied the
IPLBA without questioning its rationale for excluding trademarks from
the definition of intellectual property.' 76
Some courts' uncritical
application of the IPLBA is due to their unfamiliarity with intellectual
property law in general, and trademark law in particular.'1 For other
courts, it is a matter of first impression whether a licensee retains the
right to use a trademark under the IPLBA after the licensor's bankruptcy
rejection."
Lacking a comprehensive understanding of intellectual property, the
bankruptcy court in In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., allowed the debtor to
reject trademark license agreements so that the debtor could use the
marks in the localities where the franchisees once operated.'7 Under the
agreements, the franchisees received exclusive rights to use the
trademarks and service marks in their business.180 The court noted that
the IPLBA affords protection to licensees of intellectual property other
than trademarks, and accordingly authorized the rejection. 8 1 The court's
decision effectively extinguished the franchisees' exclusive right to use

'

See infra Part V.
See John P. Musone, Comment, Crystallizing the Intellectual Property Licenses in
Bankruptcy Act: A ProposedSolution to Achieve Congress' Intent, 13 BANKR. DEV. J. 509, 516-27
(1997) (analyzing post-IPLBA case law concerning intellectual property licenses and
identifying how judicial inquiry under traditional bankruptcy mechanism failed to realize
congressional intent of removing threat to development of American technology).
"7 See In re New York City Shoes, Inc., 84 B.R. 947, 949 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (noting
that trademark law was uncharted waters for court); see also William, supra note 118, at 39798 (noting courts have difficulty reconciling principles of bankruptcy law with those of
intellectual property law due to "basic misunderstanding by the courts of the unique
qualities of intellectual property").
78 See In re Centura Software Corp., 281 B.R. 660, 662 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002)
(acknowledging as a matter of first impression the question whether "following a debtor's
rejection of a license agreement that grants a counter-party a license to use the debtor's
software and trademarks ... the counter-party [may] continue to use the trademarks after
electing to retain its right in the software").
290 B.R. 507 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003).
'
Id. at 509.
SI
Id. at 512-13.
176
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the trademarks. 82
In another case, In re Centura Software Corp., the bankruptcy court also
authorized the debtor licensor's rejection of a trademark license
agreement.'9 The decision in Centura Software seems quite harsh in light
of the fact that the licensee received the right to use both software and
Under the IPLBA, the
trademarks under the license agreement 79
licensee could elect its protected right to retain the software, but not the
trademark.'5 The licensee elected its protected right under the IPLBA,
retaining the right to market and sell the software under the license
agreement.'6 Such a right, however, does little good if the licensee does
not have the right to use the trademark in the marketing and sale of the
software.1 87 The bankruptcy court extinguished the licensee's trademark
license because IPLBA does not explicitly provide protection for
trademark licenses, 18 and because the licensee raised the issue too late.
The licensee had already retained its software license to market and use
after the debtor licensor made the rejection. 8 9
These two reported cases confirm that the Intellectual Property
Paradigm created by Congress affords trademark licensees less
protection than patent, copyright, or trade secret licensees. Indeed, in
cases where debtor licensors rejected technology licenses, bankruptcy
courts applied the IPLBA and routinely permitted the licensees to
continue to use the technology rights as long as the licensees pay the

18

Id. at 513.

281 B.R. 660 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002).
Id. at 662-63 (noting that debtor licensor granted licensee exclusive right to market
and sell Raima Software under Raima trademarks).
85 Id. at 669 ("[A]lthough [the licensee] has elected to retain its § 365(n)-protected rights
to market and sell Raima Software... , as far as Raima Trademarks are concerned, it will
be left with but a § 365(g) claim for damages resulting from being unable to use the
trademarks in its business.").
18

"8

Id.

The licensee brought a motion under section 365(n) to retain its right to use the
Raima Trademark. Id.
188 Id. at 673 ("Because section 365(n) is controlling post-rejection and it does not protect
trademarks, the court holds that [licensee] cannot retain any trademark rights under the
rejected [trademark agreement]. It cannot continue to use Raima Trademarks in its sale of
Raima Software.").
11 Id. at 671-72 ("[In order to protect their entire bundle of rights, licensees like Raima
UK 'must assert their rights early in the case, before the franchisor [licensor] receives court
approval of its rejection decision.' The licensees must at that time persuade the bankruptcy
court to weigh the equities and not to reject the agreement because its trademarks are
integrally linked to other intellectual property.") [brackets in original]. The court,
therefore, refused to weigh equities. Id.
187
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royalty fees. 19 While technology licensees enjoy unfettered protection
under the IPLBA, trademark licensees have much to fear when the
debtor licensor is in bankruptcy. Trademark licensees are vulnerable, 9'
as they face the threat of unilateral rejection of the trademark license by
the debtor licensor.192 A licensee or franchisee that has spent enormous
resources to market its business and that now faces the threat of rejection
from a bankrupt franchisor would be reluctant to protest because the
IPLBA explicitly excludes trademark licensees from the special
protection.9 The franchisor or licensor could use the threat of rejection
to force the licensee into a new license agreement containing terms more
favorable to the franchisor or licensor. 9 4 Even if the licensee raises
objections, courts, constrained by the plain meaning of the Act, often
authorize rejection, regardless of the harsh consequences.9
IV.

RETHINKING TRADEMARK PROPERTY

The arrival of the Internet and the rise of global e-commerce have had
a profound influence on trademarks, challenging trademark's current

19 See Schlumberger Res. Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Cellnet Data Sys., Inc., 327 F.3d 242, 250
(3d Cir. 2003) (applying IPLBA to protect licensees of technology agreements); Encino Bus.
Mgmt., Inc. v. Prize Frize, Inc., 32 F.3d 426 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding licensee of technology
agreements that retained right to use technology must pay royalty fees after debtor elected
to reject agreements); In re El International, 123 B.R. 64 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1991) (holding that
licensee of computer software system has right to retain use of technology in postrejection).
191 Some bankruptcy courts found that it is unnecessary to focus on the IPLBA in
trademark license agreements because the IPLBA does not include trademarks. The courts
applied instead the general provision, section 365(a), wherein the trustee or debtor has the
right to reject an executory contract, the trademark license agreement, as long as the
rejection is of sound business judgment. See generally In re Blackstone Potato Chip Co., 109
B.R. 557 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1990).
1" The threat is very real as seen in In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. 507 (Bankr.
D. Del. 2003), where the franchisee had no statutory right to retain the right to use the
trademarks in the territories upon rejection by the franchisor.
" In both HQ Global Holdings and Centura Software the franchisee and licensee resorted
to litigation to assert their rights to use the trademarks, but they were unsuccessful. Id. at
507; In re Centura Software, 281 B.R. at 660.
94 See Stuart M. Riback, Intellectual Property Licenses: The Impact of Bankruptcy, 722
PLI/Pat 203, 209 (2003) (observing advantageous position of debtor licensor over
trademark licensees).
" See In re Centura Software, 281 B.R. at 670 ("If a statute can be interpreted on its face,
it is not necessary to delve into its legislative history. This is because, where the language
is clear, judicial inquiry is complete. Here, the clarity of § 365(n) makes it unnecessary and
inappropriate to look into its legislative history. Because Congress has unambiguously
indicated that trademark licenses are to be excluded from § 365(n), it does not allow the
court to weigh the equities of this case.").
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black sheep status in the Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Paradigm.
A.

The Trademark as the Global Domain Name

Many trademarks today are no longer confined to a particular
geographical location.'" Rather, they have become world marks within
97
the global, electronic medium of commerce.' A trademark registered as
a domain198 name on the Internet is unique in its immediate global
presence. Indeed, the trademark as a domain name is accessible by any
person who has Internet access.'9 Further, the trademark as domain
name is unique because there is only one domain name in a particular
Top-Level-Domain.' °° This universality of trademarks as domain names
19

See David J. Franklyn, Owning Words in Cyberspace: The Accidental Trademark Regime,

2001 Wis. L. REV. 1251, 1280-81 (2001) (noting that Internet global medium has changed
territorial feature of trademarks to become global trademarks).
19
See id. at 1281 (stating that trademarks as domain names are now "one-world"
trademarks due to worldwide computer network and exclusivity uniqueness of domain
names).
' See Laurence R. Helfer & Graeme B. Dinwoodie, DesigningNon-NationalSystems: The

Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 141, 155
(2001) (noting uniqueness of each string of alphanumeric character as domain name and its
The global nature of trademarks adds an international
global Internet presence).
dimension to trademark infringement cases, particularly with respect to the assertion of
personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants who have no contact with any forum in the
United States. See Serge G. Avakian, Comment, Global Unfair Competition in the Online
Commerce Era, 46 UCLA L. REV. 905, 931 (1999) (discussing global reach of trademark use
over Internet and how such reach has impact on whether courts have personal jurisdiction
over foreign defendants).
"'

See Mo Zhang, Governance of Internet Domain Names Against Cybersquatters in China:

A Framework and Legal Perspective, 26 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 51, 52 (2002) (stating
that because domain name "possesses two distinctive features - the global presence
because it is accessible from anywhere in the world and the extraterritorial exclusivity
because it is not available to any subsequent registrants universally - its function as a
'universal resource locator' or 'business identifier' has become significant"). Unfortunately,
the unique features of domain names in the global Internet medium have become a driving
force for cybersquatting of trademarks on the Internet. U.S. law has responded to the
worldwide cybersquatting of U.S. trademarks by enacting the Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act. See Dawn C. Nunziato, Freedom of Expression, Democratic Norms,
and Internet Governance, 52 EMORY L. REV. 187, 258 (2003) (noting that under in rem
provision of ACPA, trademark owners can enjoin cybersquatting by initiating action
against domain name, not foreign registrant); Brent T. Yonehara, Landoftherisingsun.co.jp: A

Review of Japan's Protection of Domain Names Against Cybersquatting, 43 IDEA 207 (2003)
(comparing U.S. law and Japanese law in curbing cybersquatting of protected trademarks
on Internet).
Unrestricted Top-Level-Domains ("TLD") include aero, .biz, .com, .coop, .info,
.museum, name, .net, and org. There are second-level domains within these TLDs.
Potential registrants can obtain domain names in a particular TLD or a domain name for a
second-level domain within the TLDs. A second-level domain and the domain name
attached to it must also be unique: "the DNS would break down if the domain names for
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greatly enhances the value of the trademarks. 1
For many Internet companies, having the right domain name is crucial
for survival in the challenging e-commerce sector of the economy. 2°2
Internet companies rely on their domain names to attract and retain
visitors to their websites. 20 3 Internet surfers use domain names to search
for websites. 2 4 In the last few years, several domain names have become
familiar source signifiers.
Yahoo.com, 2 2 travelocity.com,/
and

different locations within the TLDs were identical. Therefore, once a second-level domain
has been registered, no one can register an identical domain name within that top level
domain. A second-level domain holder can then create lower-level domains within their
second-level domain." Ryan R. Owens, Note, Domain Name Dispute Resolution After Sallen
v. Corinthians Licenciamentos & Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntameiento de
Barcelona, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 257, 261 (2003).
"1 Trademark owners believe that if their trademarks are registered as domain names
by cybersquatters, the value of the domains decrease each day as they are held by the
cybersquatters who prevent potential customers reaching the trademark owners' websites.
Luke A. Walker, ICANN'S Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 15 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 289, 307 (2000).
See Angela L. Patterson, Comment, With Liberty and Domain Names for All:
Restructuring Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policies, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 375, 385-86
(2003) (noting that domain name has become standard part of company's contact
information and that possession of domain name that is also trademark or brand "leads to
increased sales, trades, and other transactions").
Internet companies enforce their trademarked domain names by pursuing
registrants who obtained domain name registrations that incorporate the trademarks in
bad faith. For example, Yahoo brought a proceeding against the registrant of yahooth.com
and was successful. See Yahoo!, Inc. v. Somsak Sooksripanich and Others, WIPO Case No.
D2000-1461 (Jan. 29,2001), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/htrrl
/2000/d2000-1461.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2004). The panel decided that the registrant
"intentionally attempted to attract Yahoo's customers to the registrant's websites and
prevented Yahoo from reflecting its trademark by using the domain names." Areeya
Ratanayu, Cybersquattingin Thailand: The Thai TrademarkAct and the Uniform Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy, 1 BUFF.INTELL. PROP. L.J. 203, 212 (2002).
" An Internet user has two common methods of searching for a particular website.
She can type a domain name into a browser or use a search engine. Brookfield Comm. Inc.
v. W. Coast Ent. Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999). The easier method is a search by
domain name. See Interactive Prods. Corp. v. a2z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d
687, 691 (6th Cir. 2003) (observing that Internet users who are seeking to locate web
resources often use domain names for searches); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d
1316, 1327 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that specific website is most easily located by entering its
domain name into browser).
" The Yahoo website is the most visited web site according to Alexa.com, an
Amazon.corn company. See http://www.alexa.com/site/ds/top_500 (last visited July 16,
2003).
In 2000, Yahoo was the second most visited web site according to a
Nielson/Netratings in August 2000. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace 2.0, 79 TEX. L.
REv. 447, 476 n.116 (2001) (book review).
2
Travelocity is ranked thirteenth by WeblOO.com. See http://www.webl00.com
/listings/all.html (last visited July 16, 2003).
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google.com' °7 are just a few examples. These domain names function as
2°
trademarks and are entitled to the protection of trademark law. 8
The recent collapse of the e-commerce bubble has forced many
209
Internet-based companies into insolvency.
Imagine that a licensor,
who owns a number of trademarked domain names and who licenses
those domain names to third parties, is now in bankruptcy. 211 The
bankrupt licensor decides to reject the licenses relating to domain names.
The rejection will severely disrupt the licensees' business, perhaps much
more than in the non-Internet context. The effects are more pronounced
in the field of Internet commerce because the domain name has become
211
global Internet customers
the storefront of the licensee's business;
reach the licensee's website through the domain name.212 Without the

See
20 Google is ranked first among the top search engines on the Internet.
http:/ /search-engines.nettop20.com (last visited July 16, 2003).
" Indeed, these domain names are registered as trademarks. Travelocity has been
registered for a number of classes of services. For example, Travelocity with the
registration number 2,254,700 is for electronic retailing, travel, and hotel reservation
services. Yahoo, with registration number 2,159,115, is for electronic mail services and with
2,403,227 for online retail and mail order services, telecommunication, and multiple-user
access to computer networks. Google's trademark application has a serial number
75,978,469. See http://tess2.uspto.gov/bin/gate.exe (last visited Mar. 4, 2004).
20 Andrew M. Kaufman, Counseling the Financially Distressed Technology Company:
Finding and Preserving Value in E-commerce Assets, 697 PLI/Pat 69, 75 (2002) (stating that
number of Internet companies that have failed in last few years is "staggering"); Agin,
supra note 88, at 379 (noting that .com start-ups are now "failing in record numbers as the
business cycle turns downward"); see also Myers, supra note 2, at 4 (stating that numerous
e-companies have either closed or declared bankruptcy, leaving behind creditors and
investors and "the bankruptcy courts and lawyers, who must now decide how traditional
laws apply to these new misfits of the business world").
210 See Kaufman, supra note 209, at 90, 95 (noting that domain names are important
assets of e-commerce companies, and suggesting that creditors should perfect their security
interest in domain names prior to e-commerce companies becoming insolvent).
211 See Philip G. Hampton, Legal Issues in Cyberspace, 713 PLI/Pat 629, 637 (2002)
("Commercially, a domain name is an online storefront."); Myers, supra note 2, at 48
(stating that, since Internet is thought of as virtual marketplace, domain is thought of as
"virtual storefront or identifier of e-commerce company"); Heather E. Nolan, Protecting
Consumersfrom Cybersquatters: Is the ACPA Standing Up?, 14 LoY. CONSUMER L. REV. 175,
177 (2002) (stating that domain names are awnings of electronic storefronts); Christina M.
Lemon, Comment, Internet Domain Names, Cybersquattingand the Right of Publicity: Where
Does the Right Belong in Cyberspace?, 24 WHITOER L. REV. 291, 293 (2002) (noting that
domain names have become online storefronts).
212 See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1327 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that
domain names have functional use beyond being mere addresses, as they help customers
reach intended websites, avoiding cumbersome use of Internet search engines); Hampton,
supra note 211, at 637 (stating that domain name is "unique and permanent, i.e., a web
fingerprint. It can create, reinforce and extend a brand and provide a single point of
contact for customers, investors, partners and suppliers.").
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domain name, the licensee's website is not operational 2 " and is
unconnected to the global electronic world of commerce. 214 To reject the
license relating to the domain name is to extinguish the licensee's entire
global e-commerce business.
Further, the licensee may have devoted substantial resources to build
the website, both the software structure and the contents, and to
maintain the website for Internet business.216 The licensee likely has
spent advertising resources on the domain name to attract customers to
its website.217 The rejection of the license relating to the domain name
213 Since domain names are memorable alphanumeric characters that are correlated to
websites' IP addresses, Internet users can access a particular website by entering domain
names, instead of the website's cumbersome IP address. Without the domain names, the
websites are not connected to the network. See Robert V. Donahoe, Beyond.com: What Risk
Does the Explosive Growth of Top Level Domains Pose to Your Trademark: Can You Get Any
Relief?, 4 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PRoP. 59, 61 (2002) (noting that each IP address is
numerical identification used to locate specific computer connected to World Wide Web);
see also Am. Online, Inc. v. Huang, 106 F. Supp. 2d 848, 851 n.5 (E.D. Va. 2000) (noting that
web page is identified by its Uniform Resource Locator ("URL"), which includes domain
name, identifies file, and indicates protocol required to access file); Justin Hughes, The
Internet and The Persistenceof Law, 44 B.C. L. REV. 359, 377 (2003) (noting each domain name
is memorable alphanumeric name that is overlaid upon and corresponds to actual Internet
address).
", "A significant purpose of a domain name is to identify the entity that owns the web
site." Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1327; see also Gillian K. Hadfield, Privatizing Commercial Law:
Lessons from ICANN, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 257, 280 (2002) (asserting that "unique
and reliable link between particular provider of a website and a domain name" promotes
"efficiency by reducing the costs of search and structure a reputation
mechanism to
provide incentives for sellers to provide goods and services of a consistent level of
quality").
21 Indeed, the licensee will no longer have its storefront in the global e-commerce
world. Customers will not be able to reach the licensee's website without the domain
name. See Panavision,141 F.3d at 1327 (noting that domain names help customers to reach
intended websites); see also G. Gervaise Davis III, Internet Domain Names and Trademarks:
Recent Developments in Domestic and InternationalDisputes, 21 HASTINGS COMM & ENT. L.J.
601, 607 (1999) (noting decline in traffic when there is change in Internet address that
causes consumers to be unable to locate desired website).
216 Many web sites today are sophisticated portals where business transactions are
made and relationships with customers, partners, investors, consultants, and employees
are built in real time. See Thomas M. Laudise & Leonard T. Nuara, How to Contractfor a
Successful E-commerce Development Project: Beating the Odds, 58 Bus. LAW. 299, 300-01 (2002)
(observing sophistication of websites in e-commerce and that cost for developing ecommerce site is in millions of dollars).
217 See Bruce Abramson, From Investor Fantasy to Regulatory Nightmare: Bad Network
Economics and the Internet's Inevitable Monopolists, 16 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 159, 178 (2002)
(analogizing costs of advertising spent by Internet companies to equipment cost spent by
traditional company). Branding is often the largest cost for an Internet company. Id; see
also Greg Johnson, The Costly Game for Net Names, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 10, 2000, at Al
(reporting strategy employed by some Internet companies to offset their advertising costs
by spending significant sum to purchase memorable domain names).
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will cause the licensee to suffer significant interruption, disruption, and
loss of business. 218 Given that the licensee is operating in the unstable ecommerce world,"' if the licensee faces the rejection, it may also be
threatened with insolvency.
Since e-commerce is still in its nascent stage, the rejection of the license
relating to trademarked domain names will cripple the growth and
stability of e-commerce. Moreover, bankruptcy estates and creditors will
not benefit from the rejection of trademarked domain names because the
domain name loses its value when it is no longer associated with a
particular website. 220 Essentially, the value of the trademarked domain
name is in danger as the rejection threatens to jeopardize the very
goodwill it purports to preserve for the benefits of the estate, unsecured
creditors, and the consumer.
B. TrademarkLicenses Integrated With Other Intellectual Property
Companies may own numerous types of intellectual property assets
and often license patents, copyrights, trade secrets, and trademarks to
the same licensees.221 For example, a franchisor may license the right to

"' See Freeman, supra note 88, at 872-73 ("The value of a web site and the traffic
generated by it stems from the goodwill and reputation of the domain name."). Moreover,
the loss of a domain name will disconnect the website from the global computer network
and e-commerce. See Stefan Bechtold, Governance in Namespaces, 36 Loy. L.A. REV. 1239,
1242 (2003) (noting that Voteauction.com lost its domain name because registrar and
registry excluded domain names from authoritative list recognized by all computers
connected to Internet). If the e-company obtains a new domain name, that alone will cause
a significant decrease in the traffic to the website. Freeman, supranote 88, at 872.
219 See Abramson, supra note 217, at 177-78 (analyzing explosive growth and fast
descent of e-commerce, and asserting that failure of e-commerce bubble is due to
incomplete understanding of network economics); Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar,

Is More Government Regulation Needed to Promote E-commerce?, 35 CONN. L.

REV.

195, 206

n.71 (2002) (suggesting that failures of e-commerce businesses may be caused by lack of
privacy protection for consumers on Internet); Tapio Puurunen, The Judicial Jurisdiction of

States Over InternationalBusiness to Consumer Electronic Commerce from the Perspective of Legal
Certainty,8 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 133, 138 (2002) (asserting that uncertainty about
jurisdiction norms hinders development of e-commerce).
' Since each domain name is unique, the licensee loses the exclusive right to use the
domain name. Such loss will cause the domain name to decrease in value because the
domain name has built its goodwill at the website through the traffic to the website. See
Freeman, supra note 88, at 872 (stating that domain name loses its value through transfer or
abandonment).
22

See generally Craig J. Madson, Patent Misuse in FranchiseAgreements: A Ripple on the

Waters of Franchise Law, 20 FRANCHISE L.J. 107, 107 (2001) ("Many of today's franchise
agreements will include not only the typical rights to use the franchisor's name, trademark,
and know-how, but also the rights to use or otherwise take advantage of the franchisor's
patents."); Squyres, supra note 167, at 490 (noting that trademark owners license
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use certain secret processes and formulas for the manufacture of rum
products along with the right to use the name Matu for the distribution
and sale of the rum products. M If the franchisor is in bankruptcy and
subsequently rejects the license agreement, the rejection would not
automatically result in the termination of the franchisee's right to the
secret process and formulas, nor would it eliminate the licensee's right to
manufacture and sell the rum products. Under the IPLBA, the franchisee
has the option to retain these rights. m Yet ironically, under the IPLBA,
the franchisee could not retain the right to use the name Matu for the sale
of the rum products. 224 In addition, the franchisor could not sell rum
products manufactured according to the secret processes and formula,
but it could use the trademark Matu to distribute and sell other
products.9
Such a result would harm the franchisee by preventing it
from using the Matu trademark to market what is, in effect, Matu rum
products.22
A trademark licensee, in a similar situation as the franchisee in the
above example, often is the entity that built the goodwill in the
trademark through the actual use of the trademark in connection with
the secret processes and formula or other intellectual property protected
under the IPLBA.22 The value of the secret processes and formula is

trademarks as "part of an entire package which involves the licensing of know-how or
special technological processes or techniques").
The example is based on In re Matusalem & Matusa of Fla., Inc., 158 B.R. 514 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1993).
' See id. at 521-22 ("Even if rejection were permitted, it would not automatically result
in the termination of [franchisee's] exclusive rights within its territorial area to the secret
process and formulas used to make rum products or [franchisee's] exclusive rights to
manufacture and sell these products within its territorial area.").
2 Id. at 522 (noting that upon rejection, debtor franchisor could use trademark outside
exclusive territory of franchisee, "which it can do now, but could not sell rum under the
rum label made with secret formula in"franchisee's exclusive territories).
Id. (stating that debtor "could use the name outside the exclusive territory of
[franchisee]... but could not sell rum under the rum label made with the secret formula in
[franchisee's] exclusive territories").
Id. (concluding proposed rejection "would utterly destroy the business of"
franchisee).
' One commentator has urged that in circumstances where franchisees were granted
exclusive use of a trademark in an exclusive territory of franchise operation, the franchisees
should upon termination of the franchise agreement have the right to use the goodwill they
have built. See Robert W. Emerson, Franchising Covenants Against Competition, 80 IOWA L.
REV. 1049, 1092 (1995) ("When franchisees have contributed significantly to the goodwill
value of a franchised trademark, enforcement of noncompetition covenants that prevent
those franchisees from using the goodwill they helped to establish seems particularly
harsh.... Franchisees should be permitted the same right to use their own goodwill and
skills to compete against a former franchisor.").
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further developed and enhanced by the association with the
trademark22' Since the rum products are sold under the same trademark
each time, the value of the trademark is dependent on the trademark
actually being used with the secret processes and formulas.2 The value
of the trademark will be destroyed because while the franchisor could
use the trademark, it could not use it in connection with the manufacture,
distribution, and sale of the rum products that were previously sold
under the Matu trademark.i3 The result would diminish the value of the
trademark and its associated goodwill, thereby benefiting neither the
estate nor its unsecured creditors.
Further, such mix-matched use of the trademark may cause consumer
confusion and destroy the established goodwill in the trademark itself.23'
To return to the Matu rum hypothetical, the consumer has already come
to associate the Matu label with the goodwill that has been established
through the use of the trademark with the secret processes and formula.
The consumer would soon discover that the Matu label no longer
guarantees the same quality once the debtor franchisor starts to sell a
different type of rum, because the franchisee has elected to retain the
exclusive right to use the know-how of the rum products as permitted
under the IPLBA.
This example illustrates how the license of a trademark can be closely
interrelated with the license of the other intellectual property rights that
are explicitly protected under the IPLBA.
The severance of the

I Similarly, there are synergies between patents and trademarks that provide
complimentary effects for the overall protection of the intellectual property assets in the
marketplace. Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 10, at 1473.
The value of the trademark lies in the goodwill associated with products or services.
See 1 JEROME GILSON ET AL., TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 1.03 [7] [a] (2002)
(stating that trademark is considered property of sort, intellectual property, which derives
its value from goodwill associated with product). Moreover, as courts have recognized
that a purpose of trademark law is to protect the consumers from being misled, the
purpose "may be undercut by materially different products that have the same trademark
because such products may confuse consumers and erode consumer goodwill toward the
mark." Laurence P. Colton & Nigam Acharya, Intellectual Property,53 MERCER L. REV. 1473,
1489 (2002).
1 Matusalem & Matusa, 158 B.R. at 522 (concluding that in addition to destroying
franchisee's business, proposed rejection was not beneficial to debtor as its new proposed
business venture lacked realistic expectation of success).
23 The trademark is now effectively transferred back to the licensor, who then uses the
trademark divorced from its established goodwill in selling rums that are different from
those with which the consumer has come to associate the trademark. Such trademark
practice is akin to assignment in gross. See Note, Badwill, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1845, 1851
(2003) (discussing prohibition of sale or assignment of trademarks "in gross" - that is,
separate from their associated goodwill).
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interrelationship under the Paradigm does not accord with modem
business practice, which often relies on the simultaneous use and
licensing of multiple forms of intellectual property.232 Consequently,
excluding trademarks from the Intellectual Property Bankruptcy
Paradigm does not assist the debtor, unsecured creditors, or the
franchisee.
V.

ENDING THE EXCLUSION OF TRADEMARKS

In light of both the changing role of trademarks in the Internet
economy M and the integration of trademarks with other protected
intellectual property in licensing arrangements, m the IPLBA should be
amended to include trademarks within its protections.
The current section 365(n) grants the debtor enhanced bargaining
leverage, as the trustee or debtor-in-possession could threaten rejection
in order to obtain favorable terms in renegotiation with the trademark
licensees.2 m Since the plain language of section 365 excludes trademarks,
rejection is not just a threat, but a reality as bankruptcy courts interpret
the statute literally, giving deference to the debtor's business judgment
in the rejection. Thus, if the licensor files for bankruptcy, the licensee's
business may be in peril if it depends heavily on the trademark license.
Particularly if the licensee has spent substantial resources building the
goodwill of the trademark, preserving the trademark, and executing an
aggressive marketing campaign, the licensee may be forced either to
renegotiate the license under terms much more favorable to the debtor,

22

See generally Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 10, at 1460-61.

See supra Part IV.
Id.
See Riback, supranote 194, at 209 ("It should be obvious that § 365 can give a debtorlicensor enormous bargaining leverage, particularly if the licensee's business depends on
the license. The debtor can use the threat of rejection to renegotiate the terms of licenses.").
See id. (noting that courts generally uphold debtor's decision to reject so long as it is
good faith exercise of business judgment that may benefit estate). Courts rarely disallow
rejection. Id. (discussing 1983 patent and trademark license case wherein court declined
rejection because rejection would utterly destroy licensee and harm was "vastly
disproportionate to any benefit that creditors might receive").
In evaluating whether the debtor's rejection is an exercise of business judgment, the
court may consider additional factors, including whether: 1) the contract burdens the
estate financially; 2) rejection would result in a large claim against the estate; 3) the debtor
showed real economic benefit resulting from the rejection; and 4) upon balancing the
equities, rejection would do more harm to the nondebtor party than to the debtor if not
rejected. In re G Survivor Corp., 171 B.R. 755, 757-58 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994). Generally,
however, "absent a showing of bad faith, or an abuse of business discretion, the debtor's
business judgment will not be altered." Id. at 757.
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or face the consequences of rejection.2
The congressional failure to address the trademark license agreement
rejection issues in the IPLBA was a result of Congress' reluctance to
extend the IPLBA's protection to trademarks.23 The reluctance stems
from concern over whether the debtor licensor can control the quality of
the licensee's products or services if the licensee is allowed to continue to
use the trademark upon the licensor's rejection of the trademark license
agreement. 239
Whether the reluctance warrants the exclusion of
trademarks from the protection provided under the IPLBA must be
examined in light of the prevalent practices of trademark licensors in
license arrangements. 240

Though it is true that a trademark license often includes the licensor's
quality control provision in order to avoid a "naked license," 241
frequently the licensor itself does not conduct the quality control, but
merely
imposes
a quality standard provision to which the licensee must
11 242
,r
adhere.
The licensor itself does not attend to the provision by
' Smolinksy, supra note 91, at 253. See Sally Abel, Quality Control in Trademark
Licensing, 736 PLI/Pat 383, 395 (2003) (stating that debtor licensor's rejection of trademark
license will have deleterious effect since licensee has built thriving business in large part
dependent on underlying trademark license).
'z A commentator has noted that Congressional reluctance to extend the benefits of
section 365(n) to trademark licensees produces a "serendipitous result [that] hardly seems
just." Abel, supra note 237, at 395.
' Congress essentially ducked the problem because trademark licensing relationships
depend "to a large extent on control of the quality of the products or services sold by the
licensee." S. REP. No. 100-505, at 5 (1988).
240 Criticism of the Congressional
concern "in the name of quality control
considerations" in allowing a debtor to reject a trademark license seems "an arbitrary,
counterproductive result in the context of trademark licensing today." Abel, supra note
237, at 395.
241 See Progroff, supra note 36, at 21 (stating that trademark license is "naked" if it does
not contain quality control provisions); see, e.g., Barcamerica Int'l USA Trust v. Tyfield
Imps., Inc., 289 F.3d 589, 595 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[N]aked licensing may result in the
trademark ceasing to function as a symbol of quality and controlled source."); Stanfield v.
Osborne Indus., Inc., 52 F.3d 867, 871 (10th Cir. 1995) ("Naked (or uncontrolled) licensing
of a mark occurs when a licensor allows a licensee to use the mark on any quality or type of
goods the licensee chooses.").
2" Trademark license agreements frequently include a Quality Control provision, such
as the one provided in William J. Seiter, On Your Mark, Recent Ninth Circuit Opinions Indicate
What Should and Should Not Be Included in a Trademark Licensing Agreement, 25 L.A. LAW 37,
44 (2003):
1. Quality Assurance. Licensee acknowledges that if the Licensed Products
designed, manufactured, and sold by it were to be inferior in quality, design,
material or workmanship as compared to Licensor's products associated with the
Licensed Mark, the substantial goodwill that Licensor possesses in the Licensed
Mark and its favorable public recognition would be impaired. Accordingly,
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frequently visiting the licensee's site to verify the quality of products or
services. 243 The standard of quality provision has become the norm
244
because it is economically efficient for both licensors and licensees.

Licensee represents and warrants that all Licensed Products shall be of a high
standard of quality suited to exploitation of the Licensed Mark to its best
advantage.
2. Sample Approvals. Before commencing production of any new Licensed
Product or significant modification of an existing Licensed Product, Licensee
shall furnish Licensor at Licensee's expense a reasonable number of samples
thereof, including associated labels and packaging, and shall not manufacture,
promote, advertise, distribute, or sell any such new or modified Licensed
Product without Licensor's prior written approval. Upon request from time to
time, Licensee shall furnish to Licensor without charge additional samples of any
Licensed Product to facilitate Licensor's verification of the conformity of such
Licensed Product to the approved form thereof.
See also Gregory J. Battersby & Leonard T. Nuara, The License Agreement -A
Mock
Negotiation and an Analysis of Sample License Agreement, 608 PLI/Pat 299, 310 (2000) ("The
Licensed Product shall be of a high quality which are at least equal to comparable products
manufactured and marketed by COMPANY and in conformity with a standard sample
approved by OWNER.").
243 The licensor merely reserves the right to inspect the licensee's facility. The relevant
reservation of Inspection Rights is as follows:
Inspection Rights. Throughout the term of this Agreement, Licensor and its
designated representatives shall have the right, and Licensee shall ensure such
right, at any time during ordinary business hours to inspect any factory,
warehouse, showroom, business office, retail store, or other facility or premises
used or occupied by Licensee, its employees, agents, affiliates, or subcontractors
engaged in the manufacture, promotion, distribution, or sale of Licensed
Products or associated labels or packaging, to inspect and test Licensed Products,
and to take any other action necessary or useful, in Licensor's opinion in its sole
discretion, to assure that the Licensed Products are produced and sold in
compliance with this Agreement.
Seiter, supra note 242, at 44.
24 In practice, many trademark license agreements do not include the Inspection
Rights. See Battersby & Nuara, supra note 242, at 335-36 (including typical trademark
license agreement). The license agreement provides:
4. NOTICES, QUALITY CONTROL, & SAMPLES
A. The License granted hereunder is conditioned upon LICENSEE'S full and
complete compliance with the marking provisions of the trademark,
patent and copyright laws of the United States.
B. The Licensed Products, as well as all promotional, packaging and
advertising material relative thereto, shall include all appropriate legal
notices as required by Licensor.
C. The Licensed Products shall be of a high quality which is at least equal to
comparable products previously manufactured and marketed by
LICENSOR under the trademarks.
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Further, the common practice today is to permit quality control of
trademarks to take many forms, including an arrangement in which the
licensor itself does not control the products' quality, but delegates this
duty to the licensee, which has the expertise and incentive to maintain
the agreed upon level of quality.2 45 Accordingly, this common practice
with regard to quality control should alleviate the concern indicated in
the legislative history. 246 Moreover, a licensee that has invested
substantial resources in building the goodwill of the trademark is not
likely to destroy that goodwill by selling goods or products of materially
different quality under the trademark.
In addition, the quality control concern parallels the confidentiality of
trade secret concern raised by those who opposed the legislative
precursor to the IPLBA. 24 There was a fear that permitting the licensee
to retain its trade secret rights would destroy the confidentiality of trade
secrets. Similarly, it was feared that the confidentiality provision would

D.

If the quality of the Licensed Products falls below such quality, LICENSEE
shall use its best efforts to restore such quality. In the event that
LICENSEE has not taken appropriate steps to restore such quality
within thirty (30) days after notification by LICENSOR, LICENSOR shall
have the right to require that the LICENSEE cease using the Trademarks.
Another commentator has noted that the trademark licensor may exercise quality control
by appointing the licensee as its quality control agent. See Weinberg, supra note 63, at 19
(noting that some courts have upheld practice of appointing licensee as licensor's quality
control agent).
2" "Naked" licensing is avoided by having the licensor delegate to and rely on the
licensee to maintain quality control. Abel, supra note 237, at 400. Further, the trend of
lessening the licensor's grip on quality control, as noted by a commentator, perhaps
indicates that the licensor does not want to increase its potential liability and stifle the
licensee. See Weinberg, supra note 63, at 408 (noting that too much quality control would
lead to negative results such as licensee being stifled and licensor's potential liability being
increased); see also Kera & Davis, supra note 159, at 410 (reviewing trademark law and
noting that modem case law is relatively generous toward trademark license arrangement,
and that in 2003 only one trademark case addressed impermissible "naked" license
wherein license failed to contain "quality control" recitation).
24 See Abel, supra note 237, at 400 (stating that "Congress's hesitation to include
trademark licenses within the definition of those 'intellectual property' licenses protected
from a bankrupt licensor's rejection, cannot be sustained on the grounds that the quality
control obligation distinguishes these executory contracts from other 'intellectual property'
licenses.").
247 In fact, the licensee who invests substantially to build its business using the licensed
trademark wants to "obtain rights to protect the intellectual property in the trademark,
instead of relying on the licensor to do so." Keyes & Nyes, supra note 34, at 25 (stating that
when licensee is building brand, it should attempt to secure exclusive right to use
trademark in particular field of use and obtain right to protect trademark).
24 See Hearings, supranote 119.
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not be enforceable post-rejection.2 49 However, as witnesses at the hearing
noted, such a concern had already been addressed in practice, as
licensees that obtain trade secrets have an interest in protecting
confidentiality. 25° Moreover, either the debtor licensor or the licensee
could seek a court order for confidentiality protection under bankruptcy
law.2 5'

Accordingly, the quality control issue can be addressed in line with
what Congress has accomplished with respect to the confidentiality
provision for trade secrets. 212 Congress should explicitly amend the
IPLBA to impose on trademark licensees the obligation to continue, for
the remainder of the term of the license agreement, the quality control
standard to which the licensees have agreed.2 3 This imposition should
occur only if the licensee of a trademark license agreement desires to
exercise the right to use the trademark license for the duration of the
term.2 The new amendment will protect the consumer by maintaining
the quality control standard for the goods under the licensed trademarks
even if the licensor rejects the trademark license agreement.
Consequently, the goodwill of the trademark will not be destroyed as the
licensee continues to adhere to the existing quality control obligation.
CONCLUSION

The Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Paradigm excludes trademarks
from the definition of "intellectual property" and the special bankruptcy
protection afforded only to patents, copyrights, and trade secrets. The
Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Paradigm has no foundation as
trademarks have extensively evolved into global trademarked domain
names, the licensing of trademarks along with the quality control
requirement has become increasingly liberalized, and integrated
licensing of different forms of intellectual property is more common.
The exclusion of trademarks from the Paradigm perversely endangers

249

Id.

zw Id.
251

Id.

' In fact, the confidentiality provision of trade secrets has already been addressed in
section 107(b)(2) of the bankruptcy code. See id.
See generally Battersby & Nuara, supra note 244, at 335-36 (providing sample of
trademark license agreement); Seiter, supra note 242, at 44 (same); Weinberg, supranote 63,
at 408-09 (discussing trademark license agreement and quality control methods).
Unlike the confidentiality provision of trade secrets that has already been addressed
in the bankruptcy code, adding a provision on the licensee's continued obligation to quality
standard will not cause any redundancy. See Hearings,supra note 119.

2004]

Bankrupting Trademarks

1315

the very goodwill that the Paradigm purportedly protects. The exclusion
of trademarks serves neither the interest of the bankrupt estate, the
unsecured creditors, nor the consumer. Thus, it is time to shift the
Paradigm with an amendment to the Intellectual Property Licenses in
Bankruptcy Act.

